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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)

LA CLERK

)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,
v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009
'Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241

LAW CLERI(

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPC
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant on December 22, 21
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent/Cross-Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMI
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include
document listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Answer and Counterclaim (Plaintiffs Exhibit 102), file-stamped June 20,2003.
' j

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the docum
listed below, filestamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, file-stamped January 17:
2007;
2. Affidavit of Eric R. Clark, file-stamped January 17,2007;
3. Affidavit of Robert A. Wallace, file-stamped January 17,2007; and
4. Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff,
stamped March 16,2007.
DATED this

L

day of December 2009.

lit/StePhen W. Kenyon, Clerk

I

J

cc: Counsel of Record

AUGMENTATION

CORD

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,
v.

)
)

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD .
Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241

APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL IN
RESPONSE

TO

ORDER

GRANTING

MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION

and

an

AFFIDA VIT OF GARY L. QUIGLEY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL were filed by counsel for Appellants on June 28,2010.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Order Re: Confidentiality of Plaintiff's Medical Records and Information, file-stamped

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

February 4, 2008;
Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped December 21,2007;
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 5, 2008;
Affidavit of G. Scott Gatewood, file-stamped May 5, 2008;
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 5, 2008;
Affidavit of Gary Stephen, file-stamped May 27,2008;
Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Opposition to Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary
JUdgment, file-stamped May 27, 2008;
Affidavit of Cathy L. Naugle, Esq., file-stamped May 27, 2008;
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary
Judgment, file-stamped May 27,2008;
Defendant's Reply memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, file-stamped
June 2, 2008;
Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped June 24, 2008;

RECORD

Docket No. 36322-2009

12. Affidavit of Charles C. Crafts in Support of Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped June 24,
2008;
13. Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Memorandum, file-stamped July 28, 2008;
14. Plaintiffs Supplemental Pre-Trial Memorandum, file-stamped August 1,2008;
15. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine re: Evidence of Illegal Conduct, file-stamped August 6,
2008;
16. Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian and/or Not Refer to Him as Guardian
During Trial, file-stamped August 7, 2008;
17. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian and/or Not
Refer to Him as Guardian During Trial, file-stamped August 7,2008;
18. Plaintiff s Bench Brief Re: Relevant Evidence and Request for Continuing Objection,
file-stamped August 14,2008;
19. Motion to Reconsider Pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)B, file-stamped October 17, 2008;
20. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)B,
file-stamped October 17,2008;
2l. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendant Gatewood's Motion to Reconsider,
file-stamped November 12,2008; and
22. Motion for Stay of Execution on Money Judgment, file-stamped June 16,2009.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court, within
seven (7) days of the date ofthis order, the items listed below as EXHIBITS, items which was NOT
submitted with this Motion, and not contained in this record on appeal:
I. All trial exhibits submitted to the district court shall be lodged with the Supreme Court
for purposes of facilitating the review of the issues raised on this appeal.
DATED this

~

day of July 2010.

For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon,

lerk

cc: Counsel of Record

I
II

II
III
II

II

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 36322-2009

I

i
I

NO. _ _ _~;:;---:-_ _
FIlED

A M_ _---.l_pM.

J.

3

4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

5
6

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN

ORDER RE: CONFIDENTIALITY OF
PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL RECORDS
AND INFORMATION

9

a

12
13

OC 06 424

Case

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ, and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
)
Defendants. )
)

14

5

It is hereby ordered that the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's treating physician(s), or

6

other health care providers, or their agents or employees, will release. provide, disclose
or furnish medical records that pertain

8
9

the Plaintiff. Pamela

the Defendants' Attorney(s) or Law

Joerger Stephen.

or their duly authorized agents and

employees, certain "protected health information" (PHI) as that term

IS

defined in the

20

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

996 (HIPAA), and the related

21

federal Privacy Regulations.
22
23

24

Defendants' attorney(s) shall be allowed by the Plaintiff to inspect a/l medical
records in the possession of the Plaintiff or her attorney or in the alternative shall pay

25

all charges for copies or duplicates of any PHI received pursuant to this order that are in

26

the possession of the Plaintiff or her counsel. Copies of any medical records obtained

ORDER - CASE NO. CVOC0614241 • PAGE 1

I, /

5-

by the Defendants from physicians or health care professionals that are not in the
2

possession of the Plaintiff or her attorney shall be paid for by the Plaintiff.

The

3

Defendants shall provide the Plaintiff with duplicate copies of any medical records

4

received from physicians or heath care providers that pertain to the Plaintiff.

5

Defendants' attorney(s) shall keep and maintain the privacy and confidentiality of

6

the Plaintiff's PHI to the greatest extent reasonable possible. In so doing, the

7

Defendants' attorney(s) shall not provide, use, disclose, disseminate or allow access
any such PHI by any person, firm or entity except as may be necessary solely for the

9

evaluation and/or defense of the above referenced case, and further shall only provide,

o
use, disclose, disseminate or allow access to the minimum amount necessary for such
1 ,

12
13

purpose(s).
Upon conclusion of the above-referenced case, the Defendants' attorney(s) shall

14

retrieve and return to the Plaintiff's attorney(s) any and all of the Plaintiff's PHI, and all

15

copies or duplicates thereof, within their possession, custody or control.

n so doing,

6

the Defendants' attorney(s) shall provide a verified certification that all such PHI has

7

been retrieved from any and all third party sources to whom the Plaintiff's PHI was

8

supplied, provided, disclosed or disseminated by or through the Defendants' attorney(s)

9

or Law Firm.
20

DATED THIS _---+__ day of February,
21

22

MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

23

24
25
26
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF lRVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

t

day of February, 2008, I caused

2

to be served via United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
3

foregoing to the following:
4

5
6

7

9

o

12
13

14
5

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Attorney for Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD ..
And Scott Gatewood
CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC
410 S. Orchard, 5te. 120
Boise, 1083705
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz.
ERIC R. CLARK
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, 10 83616
Attorney for Plaintiff
ROBERT
WALLACE
ATTORNEY
LAW
815 Park Blvd. #130
Boise, idaho 83712
Guardian ad litem for Plaintiff

8

DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District

9

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
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O£C 2 1 lool
J.IJAV15 NAVARRO, CI~rK

". ,,~fCATHY J. SIEHL
.

~

.JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB #5344
16 1t h Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, ID 83651
(208) 465-9839 Telephone
(208) 465-9834 Facsimile
Defendant Scott

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

and

attorney
moves

Honorable

a summary judgment

pursuant to Rule

Defendant.
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

said Defendant's favor. dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff with

prejudice on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and said Defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This motion is based upon the records, files, and pleadings in the above-entitled action.
Counsel for the Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, reserves the right to supplement this Motion
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1

with Affidavits and a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and is requesting and extension of time to file the Memorandum in support of the Summary
Judgment motion on the basis that discovery is incomplete at this time.
~

DATED this

day of December. 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

-A

day of December, 2007, that a true and correct

copy of the forgoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each of

Clark
Attorney at
Box 2504
8361
Eagle.
(208)

Charles
Attorney at Law
410 ()rchard
Suite
Boise, 1D 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Mail, Postage
Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
.k::LFacsimile

~

//Jo~Prior
(./

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

~\~e 2

JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB #5344
16 1i h Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, ID 83651
(208) 465-9839 Telephone
(208) 465-9834 Facsimile
Attorney tor Defendant Scott Gatewood

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241

AMENDED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

and

Defendants.

PRIOR. attorney for Defendant
moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule

and

the Idaho Rules of CivIl Procedure,

a summary judgment in said Defendant's favor, dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff WIth
prejudice on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and said Defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I

This motion is based upon the records, tiles, and pleadings in the above-entitled action.
Counsel for the Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, reserves the right to supplement this Motion
with Affidavits and a Memorandum in Support of Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment.
(".r_
DATED this ~ day of May, 2008.

I J
Vttorney tor Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r/

<

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this _--""--_ day of May, 2008, that a true and correct copy
of the forgoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each of the
following:

Clark
Attorney at Law
Box 2504
Eagle,
836
(208)
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St.. Suite
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mai I
Facsimile
Mail, Postage
Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
YFacsimile

AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2

·~·"·---_..P.M

. . . ._____

MAY 0 52008
J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clark.
ByJ.EAALE

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB#5344
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113

DEPtJry

Nampa, ID 83651
(208) 465-9839
Fax (208) 465-9834

Attorney for Defendant
DISTRICT

OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION

)

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. CV DC 0614241

)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
August, 2004, on the day of her divorce trial, Plaintiff agreed to a divorce settlement
with her ex-husband. Plaintiff now claims that the she was not competent to enter into an
agreement, therefore did not legitimately enter into the agreement and that the settlement
was otherwise unfair. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Gatewood was negligent in encouraging the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I

Plaintiff to accept the divorce settlement and in his failure to fully investigate and pursue for
more resulted in the Plaintiff getting less than her share of the community assets. Plaintiff,
under oath, testified the she understood the terms of the settlement and agreed to comply
with the terms of the settlement. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is barred by judicial estoppel.
Further, that the Plaintiff's divorce settlement could have been fairer or the property and
not render

negligem,

,as

matter

law, Mr. Gatewood's informed decision to recommend that the divorce settlement was
based on his reasonable research of the law and facts of the case, does not amount
negligence. Because Plaintiff's claims are barred by judicial estoppel, and because Plaintiff
cannot prove negligence or damages, as a matter of law, her complaint should be dismissed
and Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
retained Defendant.

represent

matters related to her divorce from her ex-husband, Gary Allen Stephen.
conversations,

during initial

Plaintiff indicated that she was '"bi-polar". however, she was always able
case

preCIse details.

attached

based upon the Plaintiff's representation

the facts, an Answer and

Counterclaim was filed. The Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment

these issues and facts and

never did it appear that the Plaintiff did not have a full understanding of the discussions or
documents being filed.
3.

That throughout the pending divorce, if at any time the Plaintiff would report

that she had received treatment or any medication, at subsequent meetings, she was always

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2

found to be alert, lucid, and completely able to discuss her case in detail without confusion.
The Plaintiff never behaved or acted in a manner that would suggest that she was confused or
unclear on her positions or on her understanding of the issues during the case. When the
Plaintiff and Mr. Gatewood would debate the merits of her case, she was always able to state
arguments clearly and consistently.
was pending,

opposmg

interrogatories for the Plaintiff to answer. Upon Mr. Gatewood's request to the Plaintiff,
responding to the questions presented in the discovery requests.

Plaintiff

sixteen pages of handwritten answers to the discovery responses. They were written
in plain consistent language and displayed her precise knowledge and understanding of the
issues regarding property in her divorce case. (See attached Exhibit "B")
That in August, 2004, the Plaintiff participated in mediation with Attorney
purposes

settling her divorce.

those negotiations were ongoing,

wouin send email communications to my office providing an update
received emails on August
m

August

and August

2004, just prior to

communications that suggested

and comprehend the proceedings. (See attached
That prior to her divorce trial, Plaintiff was familiar with the property and debts
issues that would be raised at trial.
7.

That on the day of the trial, August 5, 2004, Mr. Gatewood met with Ms.

Stephen, opposing counsel and her husband, Gary Stephen at the Ada County Courthouse prior
to the time set for hearing. During these meetings the parties were able to come to an

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3

agreement regarding the pending issues in their divorce. The Plaintiff was an active participant
in the meeting and discussion and was in agreement to the decisions reached.
8.

That on the day of trial, August 5, 2004, Plaintiff agreed to the final Judgment

Decree and all of the tenns were placed on the record in front of Judge Day. The Plaintiff
she understood and agreed to the final decree. Towards the end of the hearing
T"""nf'rI

that

wanted

include

return to her maiden name, which further indicated that she was completely

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard for Summary Judgment

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary jUdgment is proper
IJ.:>lVl.'"

on

and affidavits show there is no genuine issue

movmg party

entitled to judgment as a matter

a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown

Caldwell

898
Supreme

has adopted the foHowmg standard for granting

JUdgment:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing suffiCient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any
material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4

v.

Sf. Luke's Reg '/ Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 786, 772 (1988)

temphasis in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).

Idaho has adopted the United States Supreme Court's standard in Celotex v.
317,322 1986), which mandates summary judgment if the nonmoving party
establish the existence
case

bear

burden

proof at

an element that is essential to
As the court stated

Jarman

Idaho 952, 842 P.2d (Ct. App. 1992):
party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden of presenting
sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a
genuine issue of fact is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence. Summary
judgment is proper if the evidence before the court on the motion would warrant
a directed verdict if the case were to go [to] triaL Id Further, a nonmoving
party's failure to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Celotex
supra; see also
56( c). "In such a situation, there can
'genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders
other facts immateriaL" Celotex
Catrett,
at

at

\ emphasis added: citation omitted).
Idaho

7 Idaho

1285, 299- 300

990):

Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 1992).
In opposing the motion, "'a mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt as to facts'
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." See Samuel v.

Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000) (citing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5

Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998) (emphasis added).

The

nonmoving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 50,
868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994) (emphasis added).
Sununary judgment

an efficient resolution to a case.

Ce/otex court.

[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
every
action.
at

(citation omitted).

Under these established rules of summary

judgment, Plaintiff cannot produce evidence that is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Rather, at best, Plaintiff can only show a scintilla of speculation to support her

not suffiCient to create a genuine issue

purposes

at

cannot succeed as

matter

and Defendant'

motion

granted.
JudiciaHy Estopped from Asserting a Legal Malpractice Claim
Therefore Plaintiffs Cause of Action Must Fail.

Idaho courts have adopted the doctrine

judicial estoppel holding:

sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions,
precludes a party form gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position .... '" McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 927
P .2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (citation omitted). "[JJudicial estoppel "rests upon the principle that a

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6

litigant should not be pennitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in
another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise." Vogel v. Touhey,

151 Md.App. 682, 707,828 A.2d 268,283 (2003) (citations omitted). "Judicial estoppel [also]
ensures "the 'integrity of the judicial process' by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing
positions according to the exigencies of the moment[T"

Finally, Idaho couns have held
the mconslstem

party

either did
adopting

or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to

initial position." McKay, supra,

Idaho at

at

(emphasis

In McKay, supra, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against St.
Luke's Regional Center and her obstetrician after her son was born with severe birth defects.
During the course of the lawsuit, the plaintiff's attorney and guardian ad litem negotiated a
disagreed,

subsequent

cou.rt that she understood
plaintiff later filed a malpractice

and accepted the

malpractice claim
court granted

defendant' motions

against
consem.

summary judgment fInding

that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting her malpractice claim. Affinning the
court, the Idaho Supreme Court found that at the minor's compromise hearing the plaintiff,
with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances underlying the settlement, accepted the
proposed settlement without reserving any objections. McKay, 130 Idaho at 154, 937 P.2d at
1228.

the court further held:

"By taking the position of agreeing to the settlement, [the

EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7

plaintiff] obtained an advantage (the settlement) from one party (the medical malpractice
defendant). She cannot now repudiate that statement made in open court in/ront 0/ a judge,
by means

out

0/ her inconsistent positions, obtain recovery against another party, arising

same transaction." ld. (emphasis added).
Lamb v, Manweiier, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976
to two

996), the plaintiff,

charges and was sentenced

an

to

Subsequent to his sentencing, the plaintiff sued his former attorney, the
defendant, alleging that due to the defendant's negligent advice, the plaintiff entered guilty
was sentenced.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant

holding that the plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence to rebut his admissions of guilt
or to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt. The Idaho Court of
Appeals reversed.
affirmed
plaintiff could not establish that
damages to the plaintiff.

support

monon
defendant's

was

this holding, the court noted that the district
plamtiff during which the court thoroughly

pleas were entered

Manweiler, 29 Idaho at 273,

not

P.2d at 980. The court stated:

[The plaintiff] specifically acknowledged his understanding that when he pled
guilty he gave up his constitutional right to a trial, the presumption of innocence,
the right of confrontation and cross-examination, and the right against
compulsory self-incrimination. He had no questions about those rights, said he
understood them, and voluntarily and intentionally waived those rights.
Additionally, [the plaintiff] indicated that his education consisted of high school
and two years of college.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8

The district judge specifically addressed the question of whether [the plaintiff]
could withdraw his guilty pleas:
COURT: Do you realize that is I accept your pleas of guilty they are final pleas?
will not allow you to withdraw those pleas like I did in the other cases?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
court
plaintiffl claims
attorney said, those statements cannot be
proximate cause of any damages to him. He was properly informed in court by
the judge as to his rights and the consequences of his guilty pleas. Specifically,
could not withdraw those pleas. He acknowledged that he understood that
fact, indicated he did not have questions, and said he stilI wanted to enter pleas
guilty. Thereafter he pled guilty. The district judge engaged him in extensive
discussion of the charges and his decision to proceed with the guilty pleas. The
advice the court gave [the plaintiff], together with [the plaintiffs] clear
indications that he understood the proceedings, supersedes any ideas he might
have had before that he could withdraw the pleas.
Because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant's advice caused damage, the
was
estoppel, Plaintiff should not
settlement was unfair and
mconsistent
the

Gatewood was negligent.
position she took

to claim

allow Plaintiff

accepting
accepting

settlemem
settlement

allowing Plaintiff to claim the settlement was unfair and that Mr. Gatewood was
negligent would offend the "integrity of the judicial process" by allowing Plaintiff to
"deliberately [change] positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Vogel v. Touhey,
151 MD.App. 682, 707, 828, A.2d 268, 283 (2003) (citations omitted).

EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9

Defendant Made and Informed Judgment Based on His Reasonable
Research of the Law and Facts and Therefore, As a Matter of Law,
Defendant was Not Negligent.

In Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,4,981
(1999) the Idaho Supreme Court, for the first time, explicitly addressed the
court noted that the doctrine of judgmental immunity
were made

truth and upon an

undertaking reasonable research of the relevant legal principles and
the court stated:
Rather than being a rule which grants some type of "immunity" to attorneys, [the
judgmental immunity rule] appears to be nothing more than a recognition that if
an attorney's actions could under no circumstances be held to be negligent, then a
court may rule as a matter of law that there is no liability.
Valley Potatoes, 133 Idaho at 5, 981 P.2d at 240. Thus, where an attorney acts in good

judgment based on

makes an

reasonable research

the law and fucts

was not negligent.
was
awarded damages against the plaintiff
agamst
contest

damages

the amount

$546,506.79. Thereafter.

defendants, alleging that
underlying case.

days prior

summary judgment hearing, defendants submitted an affidavit alleging that the defendant's
alleged malpractice involved tactical decisions protected by the judgmental immunity doctrine.
The plaintiffs moved to strike the affidavit on the grounds that it was untimely and did not give
them time to respond. The district court denied the motion to strike. After considering the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 10

defendants' affidavit, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact that defendants' allegedly negligent
conduct was actually an informed tactical decision protected by the judgmental immunity

mal court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendants'
time

was

Idaho

Procedure

trial court should not have considered the affidavit The court further held
supporting affidavit, summary judgment was improper because
was no evidence supporting the defendants' argument that their alleged negligence was an
informed tactical decision.
Plaintiff fails to recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect settlement.
amount of a compromise settlement is often an educated guess of the amount that can be
opponent was willing
whether

pay

accepL
maximum settlement or

omitted); see

dissatisfied

settlement does not justify allowing

to second-guess theIr attorney based on speculative allegations that their attorney could have
obtained more out of settlement. See Scholmer v. Perina, 173, Wis.2d 889, 894, 473 N.W.2d 6,
9 (1991).

The factors that an attorney "should have" considered before recommending a

settlement and the amount of money that a case "could have" settled for are determinations that
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are subject to infinite speculation. Similarly, in the present case, there are an infInite number of
factors that Mr. Gatewood could have considered as well as an infinite number of ways that her
case could have either settled or ended at trial.
Because .Mr. Gatewood's actions were based on reasonable knowledge of the
law,

maner

Gatewood was not negligent.

Therefore, Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's Cause of Action Must Fail Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove tbat
Gatewood's Alleged Negligence was tbe Proximate Cause of Plaintiff's

Idaho, it

1S

well settled that

III

order to prove a claim

legal malpractice

party must show (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty
on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) that the failure to perform
was

proximate cause

the damage suffered by the party. Nepanuseno v. Hansen.

{1
·:In,n,.,.,pv

malpractice action.

burden is upon

plaintiff to show

caused

recover

Idaho
damages must

based on more than sheer speculation.

Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257,796 P.2d 134 (1990) (affirming summary judgment for the defendants

where the plaintiffs proof of damage was speculative and therefore insufficient to support the
plaintiffs malpractice claim). "Breach of duty causing only speculative harm is insufficient to
create" a cause of action for legal malpractice.

Willie Thompson v. Paul N Halvonik, 36
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Cal.Appp.4 th 657, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 142 (1995) (citation omitted). "'[D]amages may not be based
upon sheer speculation or sunnise, and the mere possibility or even probability that damage will
result from wrongful conduct does not render it actionable. '"

ld.

In proving a malpractice

claim, the "burden must be on plaintiff... to demonstrate by evidence rather than by conclusory
indeed suffered substantial financial loss." Murray Becker v. Julien, Blitz &

that

4

'Neil, supra, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his attorneys,
failure

take action

recovering one-half

resulted

his alienation

affections case

what he should have recovered.

trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it was "unable to find as a
matter of law that [the defendants'] negligence [was) the proximate cause of [the plaintiff's]
one-half of the alienation award .. "

'Neil, 118 Idaho at 261, 796 P.2d at 138.
Idaho Supreme

defendants' negligence caused

found that

diminution

amount that

any
would
to

amount
would have awarded

Introduced

awarded absent the defendants' negligence would

speculative nature.

because the plaintiff's alleged damages

were speculative and inadmissible, the plaintiff could not support his malpractice claim and
summary judgment was proper.
Under the standard established in O'Neil, in order to prove her allegations of
damage, Plaintiff will be required to engage in extensive speculation. Plaintiff cannot prove,
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without extensive speculation, that, had she not settled, the court would have valued her and her
ex-husband's assets and would have distributed the community property in a manner that would
have resulted in a greater benefit to Plaintiff.
Finally, under the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Lamb v. Manweiler, supra,
Plaintiff cannot prove that Mr. Gatewood's allegedly negligent conduct caused damage to
Plaintiffs adoption
discussion regarding the terms and effect
court's

discussion

the settlement,

court engaged

the settlement.

after

the settlement, Plaintiff, under oath, in open court, and in front
understood the terms of the settlement and promised to abide

those terms. Thus, regardless of any conduct by Mr. Gatewood, it was Plaintiff who, after a
lengthy discussion by the court, indicated that she understood and accepted the terms of the
settlement. Like the Plaintiff in Manweiler, "the advice the court gave [the plaintiff], together
indications that she understood the proceedings, supersedes any ideas
settlement was unfaiL Manweiler.
Gatewood
damages
was negligent

that

Idaho at
those actionsl cannot

cannot prove that
was the proximate cause

Plaintiffs damages, as

claim must fail and Mr. Gatewood's motion

matter

summary judgment should

IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting that the divorce settlement was
unfair. Further, Mr. Gatewood's recommendation to settle was an informed decision based on
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the relevant law and facts of this case and therefore Mr. Gatewood was not negligent. Finally,
Plaintiff cannot prove that, had things been done differently, she would have obtained a better
settlement. Plaintiff cannot prove that the advice caused her damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
claim cannot succeed and, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Gatewood's motion for summary judgment

_~___

day of May, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

~ of May, 2008, I caused a true copy of the

foregoing Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be served by the
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Box 2504
Eagle,
83616

Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

Postage
Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~acsimile

t. )
Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
#Facsimile
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EXHIBIT A

\

FEE AGREEplENT
THIS AGREEMENT, between SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., Attorneys and Counselors
at Law, located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, P.O. Box 8956, Boise, !D. 83707, (hereinafter referred to as
"Attorney") and PAMELA STEPHENS, (hereinafter referred to as "Client',). recites as follows:
Thank you for engaging this office to represent you. You hereby retain us to represent your
interests in connection with a divorce and related matters. This agreement will confmn such representation
and indicate how services are provided and payment is to be made.
We will represent you only in connection \\-ith the above matters(s), unless we agree to additional
representation in \\-Tiring.
We will be as available and prompt in responding to your caUs as our business permits. Our
receptionist is here to take your calls from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. You may leave
a message with her, or talk directly with our legal assistant appointed to this case.

un~il

Our retainer for this case is S5000.00. (Title to 1990 Che\TOlet truck to be held in lieu of retainer
retainer is paid). We ',t;ill alviays attempt to negotiate and consult along with you to make every

effort to settle this matter short of a trial and control costs. However, each case is uniGUe in its

C',"T,

circumstances. You agree that whatever work needs to be expended in the proper handling of your case, in
our judgment, will be done and authorized by you. The hourly charge for our time is S200.00.You will be
billed monthly for such excess. You agree to promptly pay an monthly invoices, which will include time
h%per month
spent and description work done. Unpaid balance shaH accrue interest at the rare
18% per annum).
If you fail to comply \\ith the above arrangements, we have the right to immediately stop
performing legal work until the account is brought current, and we may also withdraw from further
representation of you, as our Client, in any pending court cases.
\Ve appreciate your expression of confidence in our fIrm and we look forward to representing you.
If you have any questions or concerns during the course of our relationship, please discuss them with our
offIce promptly-so they can be resolved.
Attorney is under no obligation to appear on Client's behalf until said minimum fee has been
PAID IN FULL. Client agrees that should Attorney be discharged from further representation at any point
after the initial fee has been paid, Client is NOT entitled to a refund.

,/
//

ENFORCEABILITY: This Agreement shall be enforceable under the iaws of the State ofldaho.
Should legal action be required to enforce this Agreement, Client agrees to pay any and all Attorney fees
and costs incurred therefrom. No agreement other than as stated herein shall be valid and any amendment
hereof must be in writing and signed by the parties to be enforceable.
COSTS: Client agrees to pay ANY and ALL costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by
Attorney, in addition to the RE~AINER or other legal fees described above; if advanced by Attorney these
costs shall be repaid by CJjent upon demand; these costs may include fees for inveStigators. witnesses,
court reponers. travel expenses, fees of process service. as well as any and all other costs other than
attorney fees.
DATED:

~II~--.:.?

Gbxj\-:LL1i ~JG
CLIENT

~

---

ATTORNEY

Payment agreement as follows:

PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN FULL no later than August 15,2003. Should the balance of this
account exceed the retainer, the account balance is to be paid Offmomhly.
agree to the terms described above.
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EXHIBIT C

Page 1 of 1

Scott Gatewood
From:

To:
sent:
Subject:

"Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com>
"Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com>; "Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net>
Monday. August 02.2004 3:35 PM
Stephen Mediation

We met today. We have divided all personal assets. We meet again tomorrow at 10 a.m. and Wednesday at 3
p. m. Good chance we will have all wrapped up by trial date. I have a spreadsheet that wilt work for both of you
as far as a trial exhibit, if it goes to trial. I think there is a 99% chance of full settlement. Steve.
Stephen l. Beer
302 W. Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

T -208-336-2323
F -208-336-9060
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com

Page

1 of 1

Scott Gatewood
From:

To:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:

"Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com>
"Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com>; "Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net>
Tuesday, August 03,200411:07 AM
StephenPamGary .xls
Stephen mediation

Pam faiied to show for mediation this morning. We have one more appointment set for 3:00 p.m. I am attaching
the spreadsheet. 1 did not know what you had done on debts so the debt section may be incorrect. I also left the
401 (k) blank because I don't know how the equalization is going to be paid. Steve.
Stephen L. Beer
302 W. Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

T -208-336-2323
F-208-336-9060
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com

"'-0-'& _ ......

Scott Gatewood
From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com>
"Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net>; "Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com>
Wednesday, August 04, 2004 3:53 PM
Stephen mediation

Scott and Ann - we finished. There is a little more work for you to do, but it should resolve. Need to watch out for
social security eligibility. I tried to call Hugh Mossman, but he is out until Monday. Steve
Stephen L Beer
302 W. Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
T -208-336-2323
F-208-336-9060
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com
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SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW

NO.-----eF\liii1~~n~~:~$~s:-:
A.M"_----:--'

JOHN PRIOR
Law Office of John Prior

MAY 052008

16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, ID 83651

.J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
Byj.EARLE
oEPtJTY

Telephone: (208) 465-9&39
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834

Attorney for Defendant G. SCOTT GATEWOOD

IN THE DISTRICT COlfRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COlfNTY OF ADA
JOERGER STEPHEN,
)

Civil No. CV OC 0614241

)

AFFlDA VIT OF

Plaintiff,
SCOTT GATEWOOD
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)
)

)
S8

Ada
GATEWOOD, Being first duly sworn upon oath, deposel-. and states:
That on or about August 5, 2004, was the attorney of record for Pamela Katherine Stephen m
divorce proceedings in front

the Honorable Judge Day in Ada County, Idaho.

That prior to our hearing date I was aware and had informadon that Ms. Stephens and her husband
had been involved in formal settlement negotiations with Steve Beer and hHd been able to resolve
a significant number of issues regarding property settlement.
3.

On or about August 5, 2004, I met with Ms. Stephens, opposing counsel and her husband Gary

AFFIDAvrr OF G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, P. I

SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW

Stephens at the Ada County Courthouse at a time prior to the time set for hearing in their case .

During these meetings the parties were able to come to an agreement regarding the issues pending
in their divorce.
4.

Ms. Stephens was an active participant in the meeting and discussion and was in agreement to the
decisions reached.
Upon agreeing to the tenns of settlement in the divorce, the parties and their respective counsel
were present

Courtroom of the Honorable Judge Day, where ir front of Judge Day we

placed our agreement on the record.
was present when Judge Day inquired ofeach party as to whether they a;5I"eed to the terms of the
agreement and I witnessed and heard ~s. Stephens when she verbally a~:reed, in open court and
on the record, to the terms of the divorce decree.
7.

Near the end of the proceedings, Ms. Stephens then whispered to me and indicated that she
wanted me to add her request to have her legal name changed back to her maiden name. I asked
the Court to add this additional request to the divorce decree, and wlthlJUt objection from the
opposing side,

Stephen stated her maiden name and spelled it for the record.

have listened to a recording of the hearing in front of Judge Day and read the transcript of the
same and have personal knowledge that they reflect accurately that Ms. Stephens agred to the
terms of the divorce decree m open court in front
DA TED

Judge Day.

ThS day of May, 2008.

~4::~

~ G. SCOTT GA TEWOOD

() 51 e 5/2008 12: 07 FAX 208 336 1.~~ 3

SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW

.j
F~/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To ~f~:~,thiS _~ day of May, 2008.

.
'.'

",w.~,~
~oru Y PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
,;:, .: . . ~;;~g at Boise, Idaho

'~f~bmmisslOn Expires: #~t3
...

I4J 003

Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
ax: (208) 939-7
Attorney tor PlaintitT
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC[AL DISTRICT OF THE
OF £DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

PAMEI ~A K. JOERGER STEPHEN

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

v.

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
GA TEWOOD'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GATEWOOD.

Defendants.

the Plaintiff

and throuah
her attorney•
b

and [1

memomndum in Opposition to Detendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary Judgment
STANDARDFORSUMMARYJUDGMEN~

Contrary to Mr. Gatewood's argument, he bears the burden of establishing that no
genuine issue of material tact exists, before Ms. Stephen has to respond.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

When faced with an appeal from a lower court's grant of a summary judgment
motion, this Court reviews the lower court's ruling by employing the same
standard properly applied by the lower court when originally ruling on the motion.
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of Jaw." This Court liberally construes the record in tavor of
the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. If reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, summary judgment
must be denied. However, if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material
fact then summary judgment should be granted.
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material tact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. In order to meet its
burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through
evidence the absence o(any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the
nonmoving party's case. If the moving party jails to challenge an element or fails
to present evidence establishing the absence ofa genuine issue of material fact on
that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence.
Idaho Schoolsfor Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 132 fdaho 559, 564 ~ 565 ; 976 P.2d
913, citing Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597. 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997),
(quoting from Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2. i28 Idaho 71 718-19.918
583,
587 -88 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)), (Emphasis in original),

ARGUMENT

Mr. Gatewood has failed in his burden to establish he is entitled to judicial estoppel.

the Court should deny the Motion on this issue outright as Gatewood failed to
provide the Court with the transcript

the August 5. 2004 hearing. While Gatewood cites

itkKay v. Owen, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, (1997), in which the Idaho Supreme Court

obviously had the benefit of the Court transcript because the Court quoted from it in the Court's
decision, Gatewood failed to provide this Court with a copy of the relevant transcript.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

(Gatewood not only has a copy of the transcript, but the audio recording as well, as he contends
in paragraph 8 of his Affidavit.) All Gatewood provided to the Court was a self-serving
statement in his affidavit that he had reviewed the transcript and contends that Ms. Stephen
agreed to the settlement.
Without the transcript, this Court has no way of knowing what actually transpired on the
. s burden to provide the transcn pt

support

this

affirmative defense and Gatewood failed to provide the requisite transcript, the Court must deny
summary judgment on this issue.
2. The application of judicial estoppel is not absolute. The Supreme Court in McKay
also discussed criteria that would preclude the application of judicial estoppel under the
appropriate circumstances.
This decision does not mean that attorneys will never he accountahle for their
negligence whenever there has been a settlement in the underlying transaction. a
client does not learn
grounds for. or facts gIving rise to. legal malpractice
until after the settlement has been approved. the policies behind judicial estoppel
not be furthered. and the doctrine should not be employed. For guidance
purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should be made
dear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining the
inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another
way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party
states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should
have known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the
knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the
statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing t~lst and
loose" with the court.
The situation would also be different, for example, if an attorney committed
malpractice by neglecting to include a defendant in the complaint. In that case,
assuming that the client was not aware of the malpractice before agreeing to the
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 3

settlement, the client may have a legal malpractice claim. The conduct giving rise
to the legal malpractice claim. while potentially affecting the amount of the tinal
settlement agreement, is not part and parcel of the settlement agreement. The
client could still agree to the settlement while retaining the right to file a legal
malpractice action .
.HcKay

j'.

<l.

Owen, 130 Idaho at ,155.
Guardian. Ms. Stephen has provided the Court with an affidavit from her expert
Stephen had

certain medical conditions to Gatewood during their initial meeting (which Gatewood confirms
his memorandum), Gatewood had a duty to investigate the circumstances of these disclosed
conditions with Ms. Stephen's medical care providers and to determine whether or not Ms.
Stephen needed a guardian to act on her behalf during her divorce proceedings. If Gatewood
failed to investigate Ms. Stephen's medical conditions or contact her medical providers, then Ms.
Naugle believes that Gatewood's conduct fell below the standard ofcare. i
Under the circumstances, to prevail at summary judgment. Gatewood has the burden to
that

Stephen did not need a guardian and that she was able to fully understand the

proceedings. While Gatewood acknowledges that Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions
10

and disclosed that

was undergoing treatment

conditions during her

Gatewood offers no testimony that he ever investigated these conditions or contacted any

Ms.

Stephen's medical care providers. All that Gatewood offers is his lay opinion that he believed
Ms. Stephen understood the proceedings.

1 Naugle Aff Page 2, paras. 7 and 8.
2 Gatewood Memorandum, page 2, para. I, and page 2-3, para. 3.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

If Ms. Stephen needed a guardian, and all facts before the Court indicate she did, then
judicial estoppel cannot apply as Ms. Stephen was not "chargeable" with "full knowledge" of the
facts.
h. Spousal' Maintenance. Notwithstanding that failing seek a guardian under the

circumstances precludes the application of judicial estoppel: there are other examples
s negligence

paragraph \) f

address

Ms. Stephen understands the lvlcKay decision does not act as a bar to legal malpractice claims
just hecause there was a settlement or judgment.

a relevant example. if Gatewood advised

Ms. Stephen to agree to a settlement that did not include maintenance, but he thought it had, then
his negligence would preclude the application of this principle.
Gatewood stated a claim for spousal maintenance for Ms. Stephen in her Answer and
Counterclaim,J and during the divorce proceeding. Gatewood filed a Motion tor Temporary
Maintenance along with an Affidavit

Pamela Stephen m Support

Motion

Temporary

Mamtenance.-+ Curiously. however. the final decree) does not address spousal maintenance')
The divorce decree indicates that hecause of the disparity
property.

Stephen was

an "equalization" payment.

to

Stephen

the division
per month

commumty
months as

Stephen owed Ms. Stephen $48.000.00 and was required to pay

this amount back to Ms. Stephen over 24 months. This payment was not spousal maintenance.
either temporary or long tenn, but a repayment to "equalize" the community property settlement.

3 Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit A.
oJ Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit B.
5 Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit C.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 5

In response to discovery Ms. Stephen propounded to Gatewood in this case, Gatewood
responded that he believed Ms. Stephen sued him " ... only after her temporary maintenance
ended.',6 Additionally, Mr. Stephen testitied in his aftidavit that Gatewood called him late last
7

year and said the same thing. Two years after the divorce decree was entered and Gatewood
thinks that Ms. Stephen was awarded "temporary maintenance"') While we don't have the
benefit

the transcript. as

therettJre

m suppon

to

we don't know whether or not Judge Day discussed spousal maintenance on the record, it is clear
that Gatewood thinks that Ms. Stephen received maintenance. although she did not.

a parties'

attorney does not understand what transpired regarding a settlement, how in the world would a
client have "full knowledge of the attendant facts"

~

the requisite standard for application of

judicial estoppel?

B. Mr. Gatewood has failed in his burden to establish he is entitled to ",judgmental
immunity."

v. Rosholt, Roherston & Tucker.

Gatewood cites to Sun Valley Potatoes.

98 i P.2d 236 ( (99). a case

which this Court is mtimately familiar. and argues that

entitled to summary judgment based on application
impression in Idaho

Idaho

application

'~judgmental

immunity."

was a case

principle and the Supreme Court at1iculated

understanding of the requisite elements.
The "rule" as applied in other jurisdictions has been articulated in different
ways.(fnl) Most commonly it appears that the courts have simply ruled that in

6 Affidavit of CounseL Exhibit D. Answer to Interrogatory No.6.
7 Affidavit of Gary Stephen, pages 2-3, paragraphs 15-17.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 6

certain circumstances an attorney is not liable "as a matter of law" and thus, the
issue need not be submitted to a jury for decision. All courts acknowledge the
standard of care with which all attorneys must comply and that is: they are held to
that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. The courts have then held
as a matter of law that an attorney cannot be held liable for failing to correctly
anticipate the ultImate resolution of an unsettled legal principal. See, e.g.,
Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash.App. 708, 735 P.2d 675.681 (1986).
Other courts have stated that, in the context of litigation, an attorney will not be
held liable for a mere error in judgment or trial tactics if the attorney acted in good
faith and upon an informed judgment. See, e.g., Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648,
532 N. W.2d 842, 847 (1995). The "non-liability" rule in both situations, however.
is conditioned upon the attorney acting in good faith and upon an infonned
judgment after undertaking reasonable research of the relevant legal principals and
facts of the given case. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.3d 349. 118 Cal. Rptr.
621, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (1975). In other words, an attorney must act with that
degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer.
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roherston & Tucker, 133 Idaho at 4-5. (Emphasis
added.)
Although Gatewood cites to the ",'un Valley Potato case. he fails to provide
with any substantiating facts to support the application of judgmental immunity to
case.

Defendants have identified a number

discovery,
degree

standard

care experts

In

Gatewood offers nothing to support his contention he acted with "that

care, skilL diligence. and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised

reasonable and prudent lawyer.
Based on the documents and affidavits filed, Gatewood does not even meet his
burden at summary judgment that would necessitate Ms. Stephen's response. However,
Ms. Stephen has filed an affidavit of her standard of care expert, Cathy Naugle, who

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

testifies in her opinion the Defendants' conduct fell below the requisite standard of care
in many respects. Because Ms. Stephen has raised genuine issues of material fact with
her expert witness regarding the Defendants' conduct, the Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment on this defense.

Ms. Stephen's damages are not speculative.
[hat

Stephen cannot prove that

conduct

proximaTely caused her damages, but really doesn't argue proximate cause at aiL The
argument actually is based on the delense that the damages alleged are speculative and
therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Because a claim that damages are
speculative is a defense, Gatewood bears the burden at summary judgment of establishing
this defense betore the plaintiff is required to respond. And, once again, Gatewood has
failed in his burden.
(iatewood cites
990.1.

support

Idaho

796

34

App.

"proximate cause" argument, but misunderstands or mIsstates the

actual standard the Court applied. This is the excerpt of the opinion that Gatewood cites
111

Memorandum.
are thus presented with the question
whether the district court properly
dismissed O'Neil's claim by granting Vasseur and Gissel's summary judgment
motion. Because the invasion of privacy suit is still unresolved, the damages that
may be awarded therein are speculative, conjectural and unliquidated.
Furthermore, it has not been established that Vasseur and Gissel's delay is
responsible for a diminution of that possible award. To prove this contested fact,
O'Neil would have to prove the amount a jury would have awarded absent the
delay. We agree with the district court that any evidence tending to shed light on
this question would be inadmissible due to its speculative nature. In negligence

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
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cases, summary judgment is appropriate in only the most clear situations. Jarman
v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 P.2d 813, 816 (CLApp. 1986). Negligence issues
are jury questions "unless the proof is so clear that different minds cannot
reasonably draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would
construe the facts and circumstances of the case in only one way." Annau v.
Schutte. 96 Idaho 704, 707,535 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1975). Customarily, a claim of
negligence presents questions of fact for the jury to resolve. Contested facts may
not be resolved at the summary judf,Tffient stage. Jarman. supra: Fajen v. Allstate
Insurance
, 96 Idaho 886, 538 P.2d 1190 (1975); Johnson v. Stanger. 95 Idaho
408. 10
(73),
also S'fate o(Jdaho Bunker Hill
,662 .Supp.
[daho
now consider the Issues in the light these
standards.
v. Vasseur. I 18 Idaho at 261.

is clear the Court of Appeals in

'Neil is limiting its conclusion that the alleged

damages are "speculative" to the narrow issue of the damages caused by any alleged delay in
bringing the case to the jury. 0 'Neil does not stand for the broad application that any potential
jury award is speCUlative as Gatewood argues.
the Stephen divorce case proceeded to trial. presumably the parties would have had
render opil1lons regarding the value
and presented evidence
ascertainable
presented at trial.
application

to

support an award

the proper

the respective community property (real estate)
spousal maintenance. These amounts are readily

which agam would have been presented-

Stephen's damages are therefore not "speculative" to the

will
warranting

tl1IS defense.
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Ms. Stephen, although not conceding that Gatewood has met his burden on this issue, has
provided the expert opinion from Ms. Naugle regarding her damages that Ms. Naugle believes
were proximately caused by the Defendants' negligence. s Gatewood's detense therefore fails.
ATTORNEY FEES

Ms. Stephen respectfully requests that the Court award attorney fees to her as this motion
was hrought

no

and

admissibie evidence and no transcript, the Court could not have awarded Gatewood any relief
even if Ms. Stephen had not responded.
CONCLUSION

Gatewood has failed to establish his burden that no genuine issue of material fact exists as
to each element of his affirmative defenses, and he is therefore not entitled to summary judgment.
The Plaintifftheretc)re respectfully requests that the Court DENY this motion in its entirety.
day

May. 2008.

Clark.

the PlaintitT

8 Naugle AtT.. page 4. para. 20.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of May, 2008, I caused to be served in the manner
indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
6 12th Avenue South. Suite 1] 3
Nampa. Idaho 8365

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LA W, INC

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

410 S. Orchard. Ste.
Boise, In 83705

Eric R. Clark
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
Y.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,

County of Ada

AFFIDA VIT OF COUNSEL FILED IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
GATEWOOD'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

)
) ss.
)

ERIC R. CLARK, being first duly sworn on oath, says:
1.

r am over eighteen years of age, and I have personal knowledge of the facts

discussed below.
2.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in this case.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FILED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

l

3.

Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Counterclaim attached as

tiled by the Defendants in the underlying divorce case.
4.

Exhibit B contains true and correct copies of the Motion for Temporary

maintenance and Affidavit of Pamela Stephen filed by the Defendants in the underlying divorce
case.
5.

Exhibit C is true and correct copy of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce of

record in the divorce case.
6.

Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the Defendant Gatewood's

response to Ms. Stephen's discovery requests in this case.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State ofIdaho and the laws of the
United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
DATED this 27th day of May 2008.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of May 2008.

fj)"~d ,8 £a~~

~

UBLIC for the State of Idaho
Residing at: __ t~h- 1;---1b, :1D
My Commission expires:
1- S -. \ 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of May, 2008, I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric R. Clark
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NO.
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~

DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB No.IOS3
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982

JUN 202003

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.

Attorneys at Law

J. DAV1D. NAVARRO
8y E3J KNAPP
c90tJTY

P.O. Box 8956

Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-1145
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263

f'tJ

~

) Viet..

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFADA
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN,

)
)

PJaintif£fCounterdefendant,

)

vs.

Case No. CV DR 0301151 D

)
)

ANSWER
AND

)

COUNTERCLAIM

)

PAMELA KA TIIERINE STEPHEN,

)
)

DefendantlCountercJaimant.

)
)

ANSWER

COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through her attorney, Sallaz & Gatewood,
Chtd., and in answer to Plaintiff's Complaint filed herein, admits, denies and avers as
follows:
1.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint not specifically

admitted herein.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations as stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of

Plaintiff's Complaint.
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 1

r
3.

Defendant denies the allegation in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and

affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff has been forced to retain the firm of Sallaz & Gatewood,
Chtd. to protect her interests herein and that Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred.
COUNTERCLAIM

As and for a counterclaim against Plaintiff, Defendant alleges as follows:
1.

The parties were married to one another on the 17th day of December, 1976, at Boise,

Ada County, Idaho, and have been, and now are husband and wife. The parties resided
together as husband and wife in Idaho.
2.

There has been one (1) child born as issue of the marriage who is now an adult.

3.

That during the marriage of the parties, they have accumulated community property

which should be equitably divided between the parties.
4.

That during the marriage of the parties, they have incurred certain community debts

which should be equitably divided between the parties.
5.

That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her

reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional limitations is unable to support herself
through employment.
6.

That there is a substantial disparity of the incomes of the parties and that Plaintiff!

Counterdefendant should be ordered to pay to DefendanUCounterclaimant, monthly
maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of the DefendanUCounterclaimant.
7.

That Defendant is without funds to retain an attorney to prosecute this action; that

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2

.

.
",

she has employed Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. and Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to
Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, the sum of $1200.00, plus costs, should this
action be lll1contested and such sum as the Court may deem reasonable if said action is
contested.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against the Plaintiff as follows:
A. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now existing between the parties

hereto be dissolved and forever set aside and that Defendant be granted an absolute Decree
of Divorce from Plaintiff herein on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
B. That the Court order an equitable division of the community property of the

parties hereto.
C. That the parties' community debts should be equitably divided between them.
D. That Plaintiffbe ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for maintenance support, L1.e
sum of$2,500 per month in addition to an amount reasonable for Defendant's mortgage. for
a period of the Defendant' s life from the date hereof.
E. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein,
the sum 0[$1200.00, plus costs, should this action be tlllcontested and such sum as the COllrt
,

may deem reasonable if said action is contested; and
F. For such oth~r and further relief as the Court deems just.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3

r
DATED This d.P day of June, 2003.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

dfCI day of June, 2003.,

I caused to be served a tme

and correct copy of the above and forgoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following.
Ann K. Shepard
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

_ _ U.S. Mail
-----,,- Hand Delivered
~ Via Fax: (208) 429-1100
/

Sallaz Law, Chtd.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 4

(>..

t'
VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO )
: S8

County of Ada

)

PAMELA STEPHEN, after being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she is the
Defendant in the foregoing action, that she has read the Answers and Responses and believes the
facts stated therein are true based upon her own information and belief
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant has set her hand and seal the day and year
first above written.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me

thi~\

day of June, 2003.

~'~

I_ _e~ I l.,..-(?L~~,Y~_>

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho~
J
Commission expires: -1/·b/zZ:J~7
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_

COpy

.....

." '/.

DENNIS 1. SALLAZ, ISB NO. 1053
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 8956
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-1145
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263
Attorney for Defendant

- -

~.-
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---,-, :i

._-----

AUG 0 4 2~~;
~/ ,-,

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN,

)
)

CASE NO. CV DR 0301151

Plaintiff.

)
)
)

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
MAINTENANCE

PAMELA KATHERINE STEPHEN,

)
)

-vs-

)

Defendant.

)

----------------------------)
COMES NOW. Defendant, Pamela Stephen, by and through her attorneys of record,
Sallaz& Gatewood, Chtd., and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an Order requiring Plaintiff
to pay Defendant temporary maintenance and support pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 32-704,
32-705.
This Motion is made for the following reasons:
1.

Defendant has been married to the Plaintiff for approximately twenty six (26)
years.

2.

During the substantial parts of this marriage, Defendant has remained a stay at
home spouse and does not possess marketable skills for gainful employment.

3.

Defendant is totally without resources, funds or income, and is unable to support

EXHIBIT--S

('
herself or provide for her basic needs and to maintain the community assets;
4.

Since the filing of this action, the Plaintiff has moved out of the community
residence located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho.

S.

During the months of June and July Plaintiff has deposited approximately $2,000
into the community checking account.

6.

Other than the deposits stated in paragraph three (3) above, Plaintiff has willfully
and intentionally deprived Defendant of access to community resources, funds and
income.

7.

A number of community bills are currently going unpaid and are subject to
potential collection actions, the community residence has a leak in the roof, a ~arge
window in the front of the house has damaged glass and general maintenance that
is not being taken care 0 f and that greatly exceed the total money Plaintiff has
deposited into the community account.

8.

Defendant has prescription medications which are necessary to her well being and
health and she does not have sufficient needs with which to procure these
medications.

9.

Defendant will suffer irreparable harm and injury if she is not granted relief and
access to community resources, funds and income, as more fuUy set out in
Defendant's affidavit filed concurrently herewith.

For the above and foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court enter an
Order requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant temporary maintenance and support in this matter.

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE - 2

Oral argument is hereby requested.
DATED This!!tL day of July, 2003.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.

~~-~~~
G. Scott Gatewood

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of July, 2003, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described:

[VMAlLED
[]
[]

[]

FAXED
HAND DELIVERY
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Ann K. Shepard
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

~, Zl2?L~

sauazGatewood/Chtd.
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DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB NO. 1053
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB NO. 5982
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 8956
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-1145
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263

.,/

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN.
Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)

-V5-

)

PAIv[ELA KATHERINE STEPHEN.

)
)
)

Defendant.

CASE NO. CV DR 0301151
AFFIDA VIT OF PAMELA STEPHEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE

)

---------------------------)
State of Idaho
) 55.

County of Ada

)

COMES NOW, Pamela Stephen, Defendant, after being first duly sworn upon oath, and
based upon her own information and belief, deposes and states as follows:

1.

r, Pamela Stephen have been married to Gary Allen Stephen since December 17, 1976.

2.

During approximately the first five years of our marriage, Gary's employment required

that we relocate our place of residence often.
3.

In the second year of our marriage I gave birth to our daughter, Jennifer.

AFFIDA VIT OF PAMELA STEPHEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORAR Y MAINTENANCE - I

(

4.

Due to our regular change in residences and my need to care for our daughter we agreed
that during our daughter's early years tbat I would remain in the home and not seek
outside employment.

5.

After our daughter started scbool in Boise, I then began working part time doing clerical
work at the Casey Family Program, a private foster care agency.

6.

The rest of my married life I have remained a stay at home spouse.

7.

Other than self development classes, I do not have marketable skills for use in obtaining
gainful employment.

8.

Approximately three (3) years ago, I was diagnosed as bi-polar and as suffering with post
traumatic stress over the suicidal death of my daughter'S boyfiicnd wbo was living in our
residence at the time.

9.

As a resll!t of my physical and mental and emotional limitations, I am not able to secure
gainful employment to support myself.

10.

Due to our pending divorce, and current separation, I have been left without the ability to
financially maintain the community residence, meet my basic needs, pay on community
debts that are due and owing and otherwise enjoy a life-style in the same manner as
accustomed prior to my separation from Gary.

AFFIDA VIT OF PAJvfELA STEPHEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE -
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s,
DATED this 3\ day of July, 2003,

~~~j~~~

Pamela Stephen

.

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this fYl;day of July, 2003, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described:
[~
[]
[]
[]

MAILED
FAXED
HAND DELIVERY
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Ann K. Shepard
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
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Ann K. Shepard
SHEP ARD LAW OFFICES, PLLC
200 North 4th Street, Suite 302
Boise, ill 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-3881
Facsimile: (208) 429-1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4042

J. DAV!D NAVARRO, CLlirk

.

, L~

Iil¥ KATHY J. BIEHL
IJII'U'IY

.

.-:-"

Attorneys for Plaintiff

L~

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

GAR Y ALLEN STEPHEN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV DR 03-011S1D

)
)

vs.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE

)

)
)
)
)

PANfELA KA THERlNE STEPHEN,
Defendant.

------------------------- )
The above-entitled matter was before the Court for trial on August 5, 2004. Plaintiff was
present with his attorney of record, Ann K. Shepard of Shepard Law Offices, PLLC, and
Defendant was present with her attorney of record, G. Scott Gatewood of Sallaz and Gatewood,
Chartered. The parties reached an agreement :md placed their stipulation on the record. Based
on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are granted a divorce from each other on the grounds of

irreconcilable differences. Each is restored to the status of a single person.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho,

subject to the first and second mortgage thereon. Defendant shall execute a quitclaim deed,
~
~~ ,~ ~V,
<1{ f (
.
, .' '.
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EXHIBIT

~
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conveying her interest in the property located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho, to the
Plaintiff, within ten (l0) days of the date of entry ofthis Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
Defendant shall vacate the premises locatedat 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho, on or before
September 15,2004, and shall remove all personal property assigned to her under this Judgment
and Decree of Divorce on or before September 15, 2004.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 527 S. Beach Street, Boise, Idaho

(hereinafter "Beach Street residence"), subject to the mortgage thereon. Defendant shall execute
a quitclaim deed, conveying any interest she may have in the property located at 527 S. Beach
Street, Boise, Idaho, to the Plaintiff, within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Judgment
and Decree of Divorce. Defendant shall be allowed to reside in the Beach Street residence for a
period of twenty-four (24) months beginning September 15,2004. Defendant shall be allowed to
move into the Beach Street residence on or before September 15,2004, Defendant's right to
occupy the Beach Street residence is contingent upon Defendant's agreement that no person
residing at or visiting the Beach Street residence shall engage in any illegal conduct. In the event
that any illegal conduct or behavior takes place at the Beach Street residence, Defendant's right
to occupy the Beach Street residence is terminated and Defendant shall immediately vacate the
premises. So long as Defendant resides at the Beach Street residence, Defendant shall be
responsible for the payment of one-half of the mortgage, in the amount of $430 per month. Said
$430 per month payment shall be deducted from Plaintiffs monthly obligation to the Defendant,
for the equalization payment specified in Paragraph 4, below.
4.

In order to equalize the division of the community property and debt,

commencing September 1, 2004, Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant $2,000 per month (less
$430 per month so long as Defendant resides in the Beach Street residence) for a period of
twenty-four (24) months.

In the event Defendant vacates the Beach Street residence,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Page 2

voluntarily or involuntarily, prior to the expiration of twenty-four (24) months, Plaintiff will pay
to the Defendant the full $2,000 payment.
The Plaintiffs UPS retirement and 401(k) retirement shall be divided equally

5.

between the parties up through the date of the entry oftms Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
Defendant's share of the retirement shall be transferred to her pursuant to a qualified domestic
relations order.
6.

The property and debt of the parties shall be divided in accordance with Exhibit

"A," attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
7.

Both parties will be responsible for any debts, not otherwise listed on Exhibit

"A," that they have incurred. The parties will indemnify and hold the other party hannless for all
debts assigned to that party.
8.

On or before September 15,2004, the parties will transfer possession of the

vehicles, to the party to which each vehicle is awarded, in accordance with Exhibit "A," attached
hereto. On or before September 15,2004, Plaintiff will be responsible to insure, register, and
title in his name only, the vehicles awarded to him. On or before September 15, 2004, Defendant
will be responsible to insure, register, and title in her name only, the vehicles awarded to her.
9.

The parties will file separate income tax returns for tax year 2004. Plaintiff shall

hire an accountant to prepare both parties' 2004 tax returns, and shall be responsible for the
payment of the tax preparer's fees for preparing both returns. The parties will share equally the
community income, deductions and credits up through the date of entry oftms Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, and following the entry of tms Judgment and Decree of Divorce the parties
will each report their own income, deductions and credits separately on their respective returns.
10.

Both parties will execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the terms

oftms Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Page 3
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11.

Defendant is restored to her former name of PAJ\'IELA CATHERINE

JOERGER.
DA TED this

~ day of August, 2004.
DAVID E. DAY
DA VID
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.c. DAY, Magistrate

EXHIBIT "A"
PROPERTY/DEBT
DIVISION

-__I~_ ;~E~;~~~Be;/~QU~~~~~~~~h~~ART
r_J~~;~:7~im
~

---~----=----[
All propert!l-Comrrii.m-i!-l.._-_-f-~-e~t-s-ep-arate _-P-roperty~mments
' Fair Market Value
Ga!y
Pam
G'!'Y
Pam 1_

__ - ==~-== ___~_ _ 38~00--~ 38§~QQ~~---=-

ASSETS

--

-

1527 S. Bea_c_h_SI_reet__________________________l~OOO __
105000
__ - - - - - - I
4
Financial Accounts
5--- 401 (k)
-------------67000
ONE HALF ONE HALF
--6-_-UPS-Retirement
42~000
ONElj6b£' OI'JE H A L F _

I

7_-

1

_

8

9

House

----------

- M-a-in----ce-c-n-try--

10

-

Large mirror and f r a m e _ _ _ _ _ _

111
12
13

Dining Room
Oak Table with 4 leafs & 6 chairs

_

_

--

25

~6
27

Oval 5 foot-glas-s and iron sofa table
T_~_b~~_lamp with black silk shade

28
29
30

Mendoza
art andhand
frame
C.9_mmissioned
made bowl
Earthen Vase
~3Efcer:.a_~!c vase tre~_nter

_ _ _______ _

~2

133
34

Gift to Jennifer

LMngROo,;,__
________-r -_ _
G~lto Je:nnifer
Chair and-a-H(31f ~9fa &_Otlorna_n________
12 inch round table
Brass. floor lamp with~hade (4 (oot)______ _
Grand father clock
"L" shaped 6 cousin white Sectio~.!..~IbCl!:l Allen.
Oval Glass and iron 36 inch coffee table
Crystal ashtray------ -------

31

Front Bedroom I Office
Combination Floor safe
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x
x

20
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1

------1

x

_

-ups sauce.rs_=--====1

17
18

x

\

____ _

hade

19_

-- ------1

__

---

----f __

x

!

,

x
__
____

;.-

§~~;
__ ~ _ __
_ _
__
--1--

__
-

x
x

E I

x

x

_--+-_
-~

______

__ _
_ _

_xt--

x _

-I---

xl

A_

r
/------- 1________
x+-____ \--- _
j--

---~I-----

____ _
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t~I;;~~i~;:;;~k:L;~ii~~~~~:~·-···· -'~l-39

°T-~o~ ·-t~ jf-

I----

I --------- ___~--~-

Micron cO~~J~r_clnd Monitor

~~ ~:~ ~~~e~6~t~~:0;abinet-credenza------------~------·

1

I

x

--~_I-

.-----

~~~-- ~~gf:~c-Io-c:----=--~---~ ----··---------l----~- ----- _~=_-_--_-_-_-_-J------~-~---I----f---:t~

Picture PortrC!it of Jennifer

:~ ___ ~~~~~ style (brass)

____________

_______

I

-_~_--_-

_________

±

_

---

__

-."

xi ___--+____j_ _ _ _ _ 1

--x ~=___-___-_-_-+----.-+-.----.-.

4]_ Grandmot~_er Stephen music box
___ +Oak strait b~~k C_hairs ( School t e a c h e r ) - j _

__ ._______x_:If - - - - + - - - - I - - . - - - - - t . - . - - - - - I

:;

__.-==H_--a!fj

:18

. -_____

l____

Statio_nC!_ry Supplies_.____

1

I

x

Half

---++- ----- ________
._. ·--··---x
. --_-_-_.

~; I~~;~~ ~:::()p _leaf side t~-~ Candle sti£..k.~~!!'ps (2)

.. _ .__
- -__

C

54
30 inch_~ck wall clock
-.---..
~.. l.2__x 36 inch ova!JIlass and iron sofa table._ ..--.-----1.

1_ _ .

.

.

_

1

.. _ . __

____.________ .._ ------1--------Fire place tools
__ ._ ._ ._ _ _ ~
58
10 inch round iron
.--. _side
- -table
--_._-----59
flo_Clf_uJl.lamp (6 foot)
~~_ .~~2 Area rug

.

--1'------+-.-

x

-I

x

___
. _ _. .

___._...

5}_

__ e---------

~+_---.--+-----+-_-_+---x
_ _ _ _ ...

x.,----t-----i----

_ ____

.-.-.---.-f-------.--.i-----

6~__ ?Je~~er lounge chairs an~t()f!1~ ______ . _
61

Chair and a half

~2

Big·h_.b§.c~.r:.m·-c-:-h-a,-ir..,,(Bc:c---c----------

63

small decorative trunk

- I

64- Etha~ .~I~en C·h-.e-'-r--ry-pr-o"-je-c-'ti-o-n -vc-cid-e-o-c-abTrlet----

f?:; __ BJlLscree~~~ction

·--·---··I!

x
x

===t=·-- -····-~I

TV - - - - . - . - . _ _ _.__ ._._.. ______._______ ______
§.6_ CD's 100 pius some collectors~_ditjo~
,67
4 f~ot tall x 3 foot ~i9~ earthe_~a..:?e/plant~______ _
____.____ .
x

68
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Stereo Equipment
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I

.-----..

I

x

I

1.---.. -- ___~I_ _ _+-_ _ __

X
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ASSETS.
____
A'!1.E~~~rrou~_t:J~nd)
_ ____

Ii !~!tfi~:':~::o
Z~__
7.9_

... - -

Cof~ee/Espre~~~er

l ______1__

_________ . ___

~_fj~t\..backswivelstools(4)
Dishes Glasses & Flatwa_re_ _ __

~3

-r . . -=l--~-/=-t ..- -r --- -'I ~--=- _~--______ _ __ _____ _
-J----------____
-

§-~-n-Lu.r~_~r.~~_bin_el TV ________
-_-_-=--_. ~ -:-~--------=--t---~

81

~

I

-~~Pr~eerty _COrnmu-"itifProperty Separate proeertYj<;.omments
F~}.r: r~t~!ket Value
__ ~_'!!1l- Pam . ~a
Pall)_ __
. __
_
___~-!-_ _ _ _ _I_ _ _ _
__
----

---- -L

~l :::~:::d Sound slC~e"

.

-----

--

Whl~e dishes sJde plates c~s and sauce~~==--

_

-

- ----

±

I
=~ t~_ ~-_-_-_x =--=-_--_-- =--=__ ---------

-----J-----~

§.7_

=-$=Gift

.=:.

99
91

92
-

93
94
1_95

__ _

.__

t ____
--J-----]==--

--'!---------~---

. ____ -.-.----

• ___ • _ _

.x

_. _

_

.

l~--

]

____

_

I

___ ___ __

___

1

Half
l<.

1_ _ _ _ _1 _ _ _ _

1_ _ _ _ .-----

p

----------1---

c:-:--t::---.- - - -

Pantry

196
97
98

Calphalon cooking pans
_______________
Toaster oven
Cuisenart with extra blades
_
~ Assorted bowls
--------____-_~~_-_- _

11QL Pool Changing Room I Mud Roo
102
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ll1

Plastic yellow outside plates and cups (8)

----

-..,

- ____ ._

- - - ~~_'I===- x· ~

----j--__

Henckle knife set
Kitchen
- - - -Utensils
---'----

-._

x.j____ ---

Multi-color dishes side dishes mugs bowls
- --~storia crystal plates and serving dl~_____ - - _ _ _ql!!J9....J.~nnifer ------1-~ .Red Mikasa <2J'stal wine g~asses (8)
__
1_.
8§
Assorted glasses water tU.r!lbler wi~________ __
__
_l<.
Sterlin Silve_r seWn forJlJlJus se~_!f:1JLPlece:;____
to Jennifer
_
88
Every da flatware
Half
if9 Corning warec~oking lse;:v;ngdiShes

§.4

···--1

x
x

__l ____J:!C!!f ___Ji~f

--~==---=-_--+____

_ ____

x

--_.-1------1----1----

r-SeIIlDiv-:-id-e+-=S7e-cII:-C:/O:::-;-iv-'i-cde+----+---
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~
Fa', Ma,ket Value
Ga')'
~ Pam
.

n

10~._ ~a..stic ass<?!ted co. lors glasse. s (1.?L----104 Pre-recorded & recorded VCR tapes (80)

105-----------·-----106
1-07

---.---

108
109

Upstairs

119

U. stairs guest

111

b~,!room J sitting room_ _

!:¥~;i~~~~~1:~:,\h
Lamp Urn style (Brass)

Oltomao

_~aJ~r T\,I_JblaCk)

___

122

Telescope
Cello and Bow

123_ Multi=Coloredc~-

~-------------+--------+J-----+---f--- I
---1---

-=-_

---I------+-----I-------{

__

----------f'--------

--------t-----

__-- - _

__ ~=-

_---

__j

~=~_

_1-

---~. ~In

~----------J--=-:--- ---1--I

I

--

I

--

- xlxl

-~

------

H

----+-.-----+----1-----

x

f-

;F-=-='····-

----- l----x+-------t---x

x

I

_________
________ __________

Green table
_____
Master Bedroom
126-- King bed and Oak Mission Bed Frame----

1~4_

Half

----+----+--

--------

nnn ~~~ nn n. . ~•.~ :-: ~=_~-:nnnn .• ~=-:~=~~~ ~~=::f===ln~ njnnn

-

~~:i~CWr~~-k--121

Half

--- -- -

__----[

__ X~:~:rm FICJor Lam p -

---

-- ---

_ __ SeJ~ivide S~I_"...D____'iv_id_e+__----+_-

__ _

I

_ _ _ _ _ .______

i---___+:T:-abl.e

-

----

__

Proe.ert~JCo_'!1m~..':1~__
__~aml ____

__-_--_-_-.:.:x+--_-___-+____+ __
X

r--

125

IT? Oak night side tables ( 2 ) ~ Wall mounted lamps (2)
129 Floor Lamp

~~ ~~~~S-Q..mini-component stereo
132
133
134
~135
136

-----r=--x

x

~~___
'
___

_- ___

=-
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~-------=f_

-----r

Color
-- - - - High backarrn_c~ai':l~.e.£~ett styJ.e_}_______
Oak Armoire
08k4-drawerare5ser (G~'s clos~tL ___ ~===-=_
3 drawer white wicker Armoire (Pam's closet)

________>:

.

r--_----..

I

x
X

______
------+-----+----t

_

-------x--

~x_+_::o__:_:_=_:___:_:-+----i----t_-----{
SeII/Divide~~~Divide
x

x ------+-----+-------,1------1
x
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A~~ETjDE~T/EQl!~!-:.I~AT!ON CHART ~-137

ASSETS

t ---

-

All Property .Gomf!1.lJnity
Fair Market Value
Gary

p'Yr''':' <l_~~fJ~~~~~()p~~~comments

Pam

x
one

_t

Gary

x-------r-

T--

_-___

one

X

Pam

_
__

,

141
142

--------Master Bathroom
I~TTowel Rack Sta~d______
1.4~ __ TV (White)
~~ S c a l e s _i -_.
146 I
1~f7 ILinens & Towels
_n
1-{lffUilts & Blankets
--

150
,)51

x-I
_____

x

...-......"

---

-==

Basement
---_._---

1-____

,__ n_

Haffl----Half

-

H_~____-Half
-

- ---

I

-_.--_.-

Utility room
_ _ _
152 'Washer & Dryer
x
153 !AdjustableFreestanding Metal Shelve;s------- 15j 'Vacuum Cleaner - - ) ( _
l?.? 2 Irons
__ ._
__+__
one
one_
156 Rug Shampooer
..
x
I5?__ B~ach Street washer/dryer
'_'
x
158 Family A r e a . _ _ _
/_
159
Oak sa:;:-rabl~s (2) ~~ches high - --- _'________
~elllDivide _ SelllD~vide I

_' ___ 1_

--_x-

3~~ ~_ir_e-_ctor-~h_al_rs (4)_fO_ld_in_9
163
1§4

-,

I

J60

_

C~mp~~ent Stereo System (AmplTuner!..QLl.el tap_e.
Board G~mes

~~

- .. f-

--------f--

1.
Down Stairs Bedroom
1§7 Wicker ArmOTre--(Wi~E~r & Wood) _~168 Swivel Barrel Chair and O.t~0rTl~_____
169
170 IGarage
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CD)

._j_-_-_--~_-_-_.=--=-_-rseIl/Dlv.!ge! S~II/~ __
J
.T_

______ ~

~--

- ~-... _

b

__-=_
-------f

x..:.t\_ _ _ _-+____i--_ _ __

-"
" x
Sell/DIVIde. Sell/DIvide

f-------l------

I

--t-- ----I
=+=
t-----.--_. --+----
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._-_AII Prop_erty 1-...g_Ommunit§:t=-llropertYI s~paratel. IPropert~~ment~.
I
~~~ETS ~_
_ _______ .. _ Fair M_arket Value_
Gary ___ parnr--. GarVT __.p_...::a~m.:.j.r_-_-__
171
Table
Saw
x.
~~~::.:.----.- . - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - -....-1-----.-----172 .Air Compressor & Hose 25 feet
X I
f73 ITooT13OX(roll-~rOUfld)--- ----------.--~~--=---x - - - - - + - - - - - 1 - - -..- - . 1 - - - - - - 1
174 ,Sawsall saw
x
~ Circular Hand Saw
--1-.---":X·~l-----I
!-=--,--~-=--c.:.==-c

--_.

1]6
J77

-

....- - - - - - - - - -

, - - - - - -... - - . - - - - t - - - - -

Router & Bits
. _ _ _ _ _._. - - - - 1 - - - - - .
25pound bottle refriger~~IJ..?_
178 Freon eV9_cuation cO_tTleress?!
~79 Emer ency Road Kit
1180 <?.o.rilla Rack MetaL~~elvil]jL
181 Tread Mill
.
~ Ladder 24 inch (2)
1§3 Lacjder 4 foot
184 Ladder 6 foot
,
185 Ladderfolding
,186 Floor jack -. ______
187 Jack Stands

----.--1---- ____ ___

---==l

I
I

188

189

190

Work BenchCraftsITlan

-.:.:f-----I---

x
_~x~+_----_+---_+---_+_-xf _____ I -_ _ _+-___ II-_ _ _ _..

--f_ _ _ _-'x-'-I-_ _ _-+_ _ _-+__

x
x
x
_+--_____~Xj----+_-_ _ _ f ____-=x.:.J-_ _ _--l-_ - - - - i - - - - - - - l - -

x

----'-'-1-----

x

x
x
x

._ _ _ _ _. _-+--_ _- j
---1---

~

--I--------·--+------'x~1--------i---·--1-----+-----1

1_~L_

Hi h Pressure Washer
x
_ _ .-\-______1
192 Chain Saw
_ _.-:.:..x+-_ _ _+-___--ff--_ _ _ _ ,
193 Pam's tool box aridto~
x
194 Extension Co-rds (5+)
Half
Half
_19_5_ Two Wheel Hand Cart
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._______+ ____ . ____~xi--_ _ __ l - - - - - I - - - _ _ + - - - - 1~~ Lawn Mower
_ _
_~ - - - - - - 1 - - - - + - - - -..
197
198 Garden Tools (shovels rakes hand tools)
Half
Ham-----,199 -- I_\'io_Do,?r 8 foot metafCabinet
..:.x:+.-_ _ _ ...+____-+_ _ _ _ 1
?OO ~~tal Storage Cabinet (3 x 2 x 41_
--t--- ______ .I_ _ _ --'x::J-____+ ___+-____ 1
~01 Wheel Barrow
__ . - t - x _____4--_._ .-----+----\------1
202 Garde:n Hoses
_ HC:lJf ____ ~a::I.f:-I-----I____---I_----1
203
-·-----1
-------l~--+---_t_--204 IOutside Patio

Page 6

-."

8/6/2004

,

1____+(3ary S~eph..~I'!..".. Pamela Stephen

ASSETIDEBT IEqUALI~ATION

_

.?.o§_
206

AS~ETS~____ _____

~tjART ______
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"

--f--- All1'rop~ f-Commu..!1l!~f-Xroperty _~<!~~tte ~~pert¥J
__

___

_ _ _ _1__ Fair_~~_~et Va~~ ___ ~I)'_I_--- _ Y~_'!'..i-----~f-_~am

WhltE3£al~oJ"...t:Jrniture

Square Table and 4 Chalrs_l2~ets) __ 1___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
La_rg_e_Umbrelia & Stand (8 foot)
____ ________ ___

H<!~I-- ____ Half

______

Comme l1 ts

--1----

x

l---______

~__
7_ IJVhite£..a_r_k _~enches ( 2 ) _
----I---:: ___H_a!f Half
208 I!y.o_o.d Park Benchesj~_____ _____________ __ ___________ Sell/Divi~~ SeII/DiVide,+___ --t~
209 2 Umbrella and Stand (6 foot)
_
Half
Hal~ ___ ----1----?10 Be:.dwo..od Patio F=urniture_ T_abl~ and 4 Chairs __~_-~=-Sel~ivide Sell/Divide --- - -211 WhJte Patio Furnlture Recline~@L _________________________ ..J::!?-'il--______H-={a~lf-----j-----+------1
212_~~ite Patio LO~JaE.!~~erviE1.fL\J"9JI~ _________ ---.J__________ r-- ____table
trolley
~1~ !'.ropane G':'JI (Stainless steal)
_____ ____
--1_
'__ _ x
1_ _ _ _ _ 1______-1--_ _ _ _ _ 1

--

!j~ W_:

j ____

_

;_~_.:.n_s-d~p_-I_a~_~c_o-v-a'L-a.~- 1~-=-=_- _~ _~_--_-_~I__ _~I:: -~__H_-a-~ I- -I- _~- -~ _I:1_a_l-+f

o
_:::_:_::_:__
'

_-

__

_-_--___-1 ______1_ _ __

1
218
~~

§mith & Wesson 9MM Seml-Automalic Pistol
Gary's Guns
_
__ _

_('3!~!

___
'

~r 1l!~~---=~~-_-~--~1

to

Jennif~~I- ________ 1--_ _ _ _ _ +-_ _ _ _

x:.J---____---t_____ f-_ _

_______I_~~~:

t
_ .=J=
ru---l-

225 IDolis in Attic ____
_
___
~Chrjstrrl.9s Decorations -____________ __
1_~Steinbach N~~crackers (7 )
228
------------J
·t229 Cars
230 1999 Lincoln NaVigator----~-_- - - ___ -1-_ _ _ _.....-:..
231 1996 318i BMW
232 -1990 Chevy PU C15..9_0_4WD ____ --=~~=_
233 1987 Camero
234 Honda 750 SS 4 cylinder _. _____
____
-I
235 1989 Corvette (salvage title)
I
- ._236---

Half

-+-

:~----

f------__
-_-_--I-I--_ _ _ _ _

I

xl- - - - - - - l - - - - -1- - - - -

Half

_ _ _Xc _ _ _-1-_ _ _-1-_ _ _ _ _ :

---+----+----1-----

__

-L-------.::.
--..L..__
-I

237

ASSETS TOTAL

238-1---------
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2}9
240
241

DEBTS

~:~ ~~::,:~w

~47 ~~tlars----

~II Property
__XajrMClr:.~~Value

_

__ ____________

Crescent Rim debt
CresceniRirn 2ncfdebt------

~'~t~~:n

I

_

r_

I-----~-i -~

_~a_ry

____

-

----

.______ ________
__

comiij~_ll---_p~r~o-e_-e-_rt-y-+-s-e-p-a-r--at~rproP~Eomine.!:l!~
_

------~------~-----

J-~-_----~;_~~ --~Ta7c_c;:_I_--_____+----___

___ -----1--t .. -:!~~L----,~gg==-~I_---____l------I-------,
__

.

=___

-----<?-+------___o]

____

~~~ l~~!I~t

!iL O~BT

'm

--_

TOIAL--=·

1259

263

=F=--

Lowe's

254-!Pier One
?55 Crescent Rim suit

:::ETSAND DE8TSDIVISION

Pam

264-~otal

265

;~;
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____ 1_ __

256767
256767
---------15156-----=j5156 r--

900 _ _ _ ~gol_

14~~

14~~

128
280001

12

t----I:------1
--- j - - - - f - - - - - t

--= ~. __ "'~5~~1_ 4355'J~----oj--

-----~___ \--~--=--

_

_ _- -

:-_- - - - _

u

2~q2~

----j------

------1--------

I

1

-

I

_

_=~~"j:;~~ ~ ~~;;~~~=,_-

--------r--

I

--..

.. ·-~H~---=-,-·-

~~~ ~~~:~------- ----- -- -·l--·ig~~
~!jJ

Gary_~~

Pam

___ _

13095
-529595

0

435535

13095
__ 1

"

----J-------4----

-----------~1---_----4------_+-

- ____ ft---

------+1------

1---

-\
~
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WILLIAM J. SCHWARTZ, ISB No. 3649
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83705
Telephone: (208) 426-9383
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and )
SCOTT GATEWOOD,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV OC 0614241
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
TO DEFENDANTS

)

INTERROGATORY NO.1:
IdentifY each person answering or assisting in answering these Interrogatories, also providing social
security number, driver's license number, date of birth, address and telephone number of said
person(s).
ANSWER NO. L G. Scott Gatewood, Dennis J. Sallaz, 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho
(208) 336-1145.

83705~

INTERROGATORY NQ. 2:
Please provide the name, address, and telephone number of each witness in which you intend to utilize
at trial, including witnesses you intend to utilize for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.
ANSWER NO.2: G. Scott Gatewood, Dennis 1. Sallaz, 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho 83705;
(208) 336-1145; any staff members who may be privy to direct communications with Plaintiff; Ann
Shepard, Attorney, 200 N. 4th Street, Suite 302, Boise, Idaho, 83702, (208) 342-3881; Gary
Stephens, address unknown at this time. This Answer may be supplemented.

INTERROGATORY NO.3:
Please state the period of time during which you rendered legal services to Plaintiff.
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS - 1

EXH!BIT_~
__

ANSWER NO.3: The Plaintiff s file was opened June 18, 2003; Decree of Divorce entered August
9,2004; filed Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 7-6-2005.

INTERROGATORY NO.4:
Identify your employers, partners, partnerships, associates, and/or associations engaged in the
practice of law at all times during the period of time you rendered legal services to Plaintiff
ANSWER NO.4: See answer No. 1 above.

INTERROGATORY NO.5
IdentifY all attorneys, law clerks, legal assistants, investigators, and researchers who assisted you in
rendering legal services to Plaintiff.
ANSWER NO.5: See Answer No. 1 and 2 above. S tafT: Millis Anderson, Legal Assistant; Marge
Davidson, Legal Assistant; Kelli Walts, Secretary.

INTERROGATORY NO.6:
Generally state all facts upon which you contend support any defense that you have or may claim in
this case.
ANSWER NO.6: Telephone conferences, in office conferences, correspondence were engaged to
communicate with Plaintiff and she always indicated she understood and knew exactly what was
going on in her case and in fact, was most adamant about what she wanted to achieve in the divorce.
There was never a question about her ability to understand and assist in reaching her goal in the
divorce. Contact and discussions with Plaintiff subsequent to the entry of the decree regarding her
truck and the Qualified Domestic Relations Order indicated she clearly understood the procedure,
~lecisions, and events related to the case. Contacts with Plaintiff subsequent to entry of the Decree
involving her acceptance ofthe payments per the Decree Agreement. The fact this lawsuit was filed
only after her temporary maintenance ended.

INTERROGATORY NO.7:
State succinctly what matters of law relevant to the claims made against you in this cause of action
that you contend are not or should not be in dispute.
ANSWER NO.7: Objection; this request tends to discovery of work product; without waiving
objection Defendant disputes this entire claim of action.

INTERROGATORY NO.8:
Did you act as a fiduciary to Plaintiff during the attorney/client relationship? If not, state succinctly all
facts upon which you rely to deny responsibility as a fiduciary.
ANSWER NO.8: Our responsibility as fiduciary includes those required in an attorney-client
relationship. Defendant denies any breach of any fiduciary responsibility therein.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS - 2

REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9:
A copy of all letters, correspondence or any other fonn ofwritten document which in any way refers,
pertains or relates to any communication made by you to any liability or malpractice insurance carrier

concerning any of the matters made the basis of this suit, including but not limited to all notices of
claim or proofs of claim.
RESPONSE NO.9: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:
A copy of your (Mr. Gatewood) current curriculum vitae and/or fum brochure (Sallaz &
Gatewood) or firm marketing material.

RESPONSE NO.1: None.

DATED this

)

f

day of February. 2007.

Wi,liJf!z
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JL

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2007. I caused to be served in
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the fonowing:

Eric R. Clark
Clark Law Office
P.O. Box 2504

......,.,--.- u. S. Mail

~, Personal Delivery
_ _ Fax: (208) 939-7136

Eagle, ID 83616

wiiliant 1. Schw~
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
CLARK LAW OFFICE
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THESTATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241
AFFIDA VIT OF
GARY STEPHEN

)
) ss.
)

Gary Stephen, first being duly sworn on oath as provided by law, states as follows:
1.

When I decided to divorce Pamela, I instructed my attorney Ann Shepard to file based
on irreconcilable differences, because I did not believe there was any basis for any other
type of divorce.

2.

My attorney never advised me that she believed there was a basis for any "fault" type
divorce proceeding, and we proceeded as filed and pursued a divorce based upon
irreconcilable differences.

AFFIDA VlT OF GARY STEPHEN - I

3.

Even if there had been a basis for a "fault" type of divorce, I would not have pursued that
course.

4.

Based on the length of our marriage, my income compared with Pamela's, Pamela's
disabilities, and Pamela's lack of education, training and experience, I believed I would
have to pay Pamela some type of ongoing support, even though I was filing, which Pam
ultimately sought in her Answer and Counterclaim.

5.

We attended mediation with Mr. Beers just days before the trial date. During the
mediation, I observed that Pam was lethargic and watched her rest her head on the table
several times. When Pam was sitting upright, she would rock back and forth in her chair
and appeared incoherent at times. I even offered to drive Pam home after the mediation,
because I was concerned about her ability to drive.

6.

About a year later, Pam told me that she had been in St. AI's about a week prior to the
mediation and the trial and that she was prescribed medications that made her lethargic
and very tired.

7.

Pam also told me she had contacted her counsel and asked to postpone the trial because
she had recently been hospitalized, but that he had refused to attempt to move the trial
date.

8.

Had I known Pam had been hospitalized, I would have agreed to postpone the trial until
she was mentally and physically better.

9.

At the divorce trial, my counsel and I met with Scott Gatewood, Pamela's counsel and
discussed the property settlement agreement. When the property was split according to
this document, lowed approximately $48,000.00 to Pamela.

10. As I understood that the parties were supposed to divide the assets equitably, I believed
that I would have to pay Pamela this money.
11. Ann Shepard suggested to Mr. Gatewood that I be allowed to pay Pamela $2,000.00 per
month for 24 months as an "equalization" payment to equalize the division of property.
12. Mr. Gatewood responded that he believed this was appropriate as he felt that if Pamela
receiving a large lump sum of money at one time "she would probably go out and blow
it. "
13. At the trial, when Pamela stated that she agreed to receive $2,000.00 per month (minus
rent), which I understood to be the "equalization" payment for the division of property.
14. I was surprised when Mr. Gatewood never pursued Pamela's claim for spousal
maintenance.
15. Last fall, I received a call from Scott Gatewood. Mr. Gatewood identified himself to me
on the phone, and I recognized his voice on the phone because we had spoken at several
court hearings.

AFFIDA VIT OF GARY STEPHEN - 2

16. Mr. Gatewood asked me several questions during the conversation. When we discussed
my observation of Pam at the mediation, Mr. Gatewood stated he did not like my
answers.
17. Mr. Gatewood told me during this conversation that he believed Pam only sued him after
her temporary maintenance had run out. I am sure he said "temporary maintenance,"
because I did not recall that the Court had awarded any maintenance, nor did I
understand that I was paying Pamela maintenance.
I declare under penalty of petjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
DATED this 31 st day of March 2008.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31 st day of March 2008.

MARK P. GIESQ
Notary Publtc
Stat. of Idaho

LIC for the State of Idaho

.r

Residing at: BOI >e
D
My Commission expires: .J'k± i/c±Pf 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Q~ day of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
caused to be served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of
following:
JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Attorney for Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD.,
And Scott Gatewood
CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz.

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric RZ9(ark
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2008, I
e foregoing to the
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J ,
Eric R Clark. ISB# 4697
P.O. Box 2504

Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

AFFIDAVIT OF
CATIIY L. NAUGLE. ESQ.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Defendants.

ST ATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

)

) SS.

Cathy Naugle, first being duly sworn on oath as provided by law, states as follows:

1. At the request of the Plaintiffs Counsel, I have agreed to act as a standard of care and
conduct expert witness in this case.

2. I graduated from University ofIdaho Schoo1 of Law in 1980 with a juris doctorate. I am
a member in good standing of the Idaho State Bar. I was an Ada County, Idaho
magistrate judge hearing, among others, family law cases between 1988 and December
1992. From 1994 through the present I have been an Idaho attorney practicing almost
exclusively in the area of family law.
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3.

I am currently licensed to practice law in Idaho, and I am a former Ada County
Magistrate Judge.

4.

I have reviewed the Defendants' divorce file and Court file in this case. I have also
reviewed the audio recording of the AprilS, 2004 divorce proceeding.

S.

My opinions stated herein are based on what I believe was the standard of care and
conduct for an attorney in Idaho during the relevant years 2003-2006, when the
Defendants represented Ms. Stephen in her divorce proceedings.

6.

I am assuming certain facts as true when providing my opinion, and I am in no way
asserting that I have personal knowledge of any facts of consequence in the case. As an
expert witness, however, I believe I can provide my opinions based on certain
assumptions that the Plaintiff must prove at trial.

7.

I have reviewed both the 2003 and 2004 versions ofIRPC 1.14. They specifically
provide guidance for an attorney when that attorney is representing a person with a
"disability" or with "diminished capacity." (The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
were amended in July 2004, and Rule 1.14 addressing this issue was changed.)

8.

rfMs. Stephen disclosed at any time to the Defendants certain psychological conditions
including that she was bi~polar and was taking medications for psychosis, the standard of
care and conduct for an attorney would be to investigate these conditions with Ms.
Stephen's medical providers at the earliest opportunity after the disclosure to detennine
the nature and extent of Ms. Stephen's conditions and to detennine whether Ms. Stephen
needed a guardian.

9.

After such disclosures, if the Defendants did not investigate Ms. Stephen's conditions
with the relevant medical care providers, the Defendants' conduct fell below the standard
of care.

10. I have read the Answer and Counterclaim these Defendants filed on Ms. Stephen's
behalf, which indicates the Defendants were seeking spousal maintenance based on
Idaho Code 32~ 704 and 32-705. Seeking maintenance under these statutes requires the
attorney to investigate facts establishing the factors set out in Idaho Codes Sections 32704 and 32-705. Failure to investigate these facts would constitute a breach of the
Attorney's duty of diligence.
11. In my opinion, this divorce presented complex issues based on the extent of the parties'
real and personal property and the request for spousal maintenance. The issue of the
Plainti.iPs disclosed mental health history made this divorce more complicated.
Attorneys pursuing this case therefore should have had experience, legal knowledge and
skill necessary to represent a potentially mentally impaired client in a divorce proceeding
that involved a corrununity estate of approximately $1,000,000.00. An attorney
representing Ms. Stephen in this case who lacked such experience, legal knowledge and
AFFIDAVIT OF CATHY L. NAUGLE - 2
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skill would have violated his duty of competency to Ms. Stephen and such conduct
would fall below the standard of care and competence.
12. One of the criteria stated in Idaho Code 32-705 for a Court to consider when deciding
whether or not to order spousal maintenance is "fault." The Court is required consider
the "fault" of either party and compare fault if there are allegations constituting fault
raised by both parties. In my experience as a magistrate and family law attorney,
however, infidelity in and of itself is not considered sufficient grounds for denying
spousal support, and if considered at all is to be considered by the court only in
determining the amount and duration of spousal support. I cannot recall any specific
cases in which I have been directly involved as a magistrate or attorney that involved
each party claiming that the other's infidelity established "fault" grounds under Idaho
Code Section 32-705. However, based on my knowledge and experience, such a
situation would most likely be considered a "wash."
13. In my professional opinion allegations of illegal drug use on behalf of the party
requesting spousal support would not preclude an award of such support vvithout
additional evidence of other disqualifying factors under Idaho Codes 32-705, such as, for
instance, the financial hardship of the requesting spouse having been caused by the
expenditure of significant income and resources on the acquisition of drugs.

14. rfMs. Stephen was unemployed and had no means to provide payment to the Defendants
for legal fees, and if her spouse was employed and earning in excess of $250,000.00 per
year, the standard of care and conduct would be to seek pre-judgment payment of at least
a portion of Ms. Stephen's attorney fees according to Idaho Code 32-704(3). If the
Defendants did not pursue prejudgment payment of their Client's attorney fees, that
conduct fell below the requisite standard of care.
15. If in 2003 and 2004 (a) there had not been an appraisal of the Crescent Rim home since
1999 (b) the home had not recently been on the market, and if the Defendants failed to
advise Ms. Stephen that it would be prudent to obtain at least a Comparative Market
Analysis, if not a fonnal appraisal, before agreeing to the value of this property, that
conduct fell below the standard of care.
16. The court file indicates that notwithstanding the primary asset in this divorce was Mr.
Stephen's UPS retirement account, the Defendants failed to obtain a plan summary prior
to settlement and failed to obtain valid QDRO before they withdrew nearly a full year
after the decree was entered. Such conduct would fall below the standard of care and
conduct.
17. I have reviewed the Defendants' divorce file and there appeared to be minimal discovery
propounded to or obtained from Mr. Stephen. Again, in a complex divorce case such as
this, the fact that these Defendants did not even obtain Mr. Stephen's tax records
indicates a lack of diligence.
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18. Based on the length of the Stephen's marriage, Mr. Stephen's income compared with
Ms. Stephen's lack of income, Ms. Stephen's unemployment at the time of the divorce,
Ms. Stephen's documented mental conditions, and Ms. Stephen's lack of education,
training and experience, and I believe the Court would have awarded Ms. Stephen
spousal post-judgment spousal support. Depending upon the extent of Ms. Stephen's
access to community funds during the divorce and/or the extent to which Mr. Stephens
was paying community expenses during that same period of time, I believe that Ms.
Stephens might also have been awarded pre-judgment (temporary) spousal support.
19. If Ms. Stephen had been invohmtarily conunitted for mental issues until approximately a
week before the divorce trial on August 5, 2004 and was taking medication that may
have affected her ability to understand and comprehend the proceedings, the standard of
care would have been to seek a short postponement of the trial until her mental stability
could be confirmed by a medical provider. Failing to seek a short postponement and
telling a client that the attorney would not seek a postponement unless the client got a
"note" from a doctor, under the circumstances, is a breach of the standard of care and
conduct.

20. In my opinion the Defendants' conduct fell below the standard of care in the ways
identified above and as a result of this conduct Ms. Stephen suffered damages, including
a reasonable amount of spousal support per month, at least post-judgment but possibly
pre-judgment also; a higher share of the community equity in the Crescent Rim property;
and a credit of approximately $15,000.00 for payment of the judgment against the
Crescent Rim property that was paid from community funds, but Mr. Stephens was
credited ($30,000.00) as a debt to the community.
I declare under penalty ofpetjury under the laws of the State ofIdaho and the laws of the
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED this _c2_1_~
___ day of May 2008.

caili~~ N~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2. l11:-

day of

~t 2008.

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State ofIdaho
Residing at: ~ ldttkl>
f
My Commission expires:
I ::LIt j ~I z...
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

a<1.fv day of _-f--,--,<--+-_/__200S, I

caused to be served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of th foregoing to the

following:
JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Attorney for Sal1az & Gatewood, CHID.,

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

And Scott Gatewood

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz.

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric R. Clark
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JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOlIN PRIOR
IS8#5344
16 lih Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, 10 83651
(208) 465-9839
Fa.x (208) 465-9834
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE l)ISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SALLAZ & GA TWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241

DEFENDANT'S REPLY

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)
)

COMES NOW Defendant Scott Gatewood by and through his counsel of record John
Prior and submits this reply brief in support of Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
ARGUMENT

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1

~:eif(

(

. ..

~

In Heinze. V. Bauer 2008 IDSCCI33579-012508, the COurt Was presented with
substantialfy similar case arising Out of the 4'" JUdicial District. In the Heinze case, the cour

&ranted SUInmmy judgment to Mr. Bauer, the Defendant in that case. In the Heinze case, it
should be noted that Mr. Heinze at the time of the original divorce settlement expressed
concerns regarding the sufficiency of the settlement. In the present case, Ms. Stephens never
expressed Concerns regarding the settlement of her case until wel/ after any time to set aside her
divorce. In the Heinze decision the court noted" that Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant
obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, through means of Sworn
statements, and subsequently adopts inconsistent and Contrary al/egations or testimony to obtain
a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.
Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93-94. 277 P.2d at 565. "Heinze p.2 Both the present case and the Heinze

case are remarkably similar with the only exception being that Ms Stephens is alleging that she
Suffered from some disability at the time of her agreement in the divorce case. In her affidavit
which was provided in opposition to this SUmmmy judgment motion she al/eges that she was
bipolar at the time of the pendency of this divorce. In her complaint in this case, she al/eges this
disability prevented her from understanding the nature of the divorce proceedings. The Plaintiff
has never submitted any medical dOcumentation in the form of an affidavit by a medical
professional that contirms this medical condition. The Plaintiff has the burden of establishing
that this medical condition Was present at the time of the entry of the Judgment and Decree of

Divorce and that the medical condition prevented her from understanding the nature of the
prOCeedings. The Plaintiff has fuiled to provide any medical expert testimony to suPPOrt this
)osition. In addition, the Plaintiff cannot decide subsequent to a stipulated Judgment of Decree
<MORANDUM IN SUpPORT OF MOnON FOR SUMMARY

.Jph~'

of Divorce being entered that she did not like the benefit of the bargain she received This is
consistent with the findings by the court in the Heinze case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting that the divorce settlement was
unfair. Further, Mr. Gatewood's recommendation to settle was an infonned decision based on
the relevant law and facts of this case and therefore Mr. Gatewood was not negligent. Finally,
Plaintiff cannot prove that, had things been done differently, she would have obtained a better
settlement. Plaintiff cannot prove that the advice caused her damages. Further Plaintiff
provided no medical evidence to support her claim that her disability if any prevented her from
understanding the nature of the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim cannot
succeed and, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Gatewood's motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

DA TED this

(;1

day of June 2008.

//jOHN PRIOR

/

~ttorney

for Defendant

'--'//
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

.

"J

I~

2=. -

day of June 2008, I caused a true copy of the

foregoing Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be served by
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

±>tY.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
7tEacsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~YFacsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAlYIELA K. JEORGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 06-14241
AFFIDAVIT OF ANN K.
SHEPARD

)
: ss.
)

COMES NOW Ann Shepard, after being first duly sworn upon oath and deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho

2.

That my law practice is mainly focused in the area offamily law, including divorce cases.

3.

That I represented Gary Stephen, in his divorce, with his ex-wife Pam Stephen, Case No.
CV DR 03011S1 0, which was settled by stipulation on August 5, 2004.

4.

That on the

Sth

day of August, 2004, r met with Scott Gatewood and Pam Stephen, along

with my client Gary Stephen and negotiated a settlement in their pending divorce case. I
observed Pam Stephen both during our final negotiations as well as during the time the
agreement was placed on the record in front of Judge Day.
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5.

That my observation of Pam Stephen on August 5, 2004 was that she understood the
negotiations, participated in the negotiations and made the decision as to her agreement to
the final settlement. Mrs. Stephen appeared to be lucid and articulate.

6.

That on August 5, 2004, my client, Gary Stephen, remarked that Mrs. Stephen appeared
to be clear headed and appeared to be un-medicated.

7.

That as the attorney for Gary Stephen, I counseled my client that the ultimate settlement
was generous on his part, and that we may well get a more favorable outcome if we were
to proceed to trial. My client was, and is, a kind person who wanted to be fair to his wife,
even under the difficult circumstances of the divorce. On the instruction of my client, I
settled the case on what I considered to be very favorable terms for Mrs. Stephen.

8.

That I am familiar with the property distribution between Pam and Gary Stephen as
outlined in their final divorce decree, Case No. CV DR 0301151D. There was ultimately
an unequal division of the community property in favor of Pam Stephen, and there are
additional other factors that made the settlement even more favorable to Mrs. Stephen.
First, there was a very good chance that the property on Beach Street would have been
awarded to my client as his separate property. In addition, my client assumed all of the
costs necessary to repair both the Beach Street and the Crescent Rim residences, which
had been damaged and neglected by Mrs. Stephen and her boyfriend and friends. Also,
many of the outstanding debts were incurred by Mrs. Stephen and her boyfriend for
improper purposes while the divorce action was pending.

9.

That I advised my client that spousal support was not warranted in the divorce action
because Mrs. Stephen's behavior was clearly the cause of the divorce, and that Mrs.
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Stephen was at fault. I was prepared to produce evidence that the underlying cause for
the divorce was that while the parties were still married, Mrs. Stephen moved her
boyfriend into the parties' residence and both were financially supported by my client for
nearly two years. Mrs. Stephen's boyfriend physically threatened my client and forced
him from his own home.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

ANN SHEPARD

SUBSCRIBED AND SWO RN To before me this

(f!frJay ;:]C;:ty ,
of

2007.

\=ffiL \~ \ ~ul j'~~
\-'0

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
&~IG<./ i
,
Commission Expires:
L~( /1

Z1
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JOHN PRIOR
Law Oftice of John Prior
16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa. [D 83651
Telephone: (208) 465-9839
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,

)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 06-14241

)

AFFIDAVIT OF MILLIS
M.ANDERSON

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------~

STA IE OF IDAHO
County 01' Ada

)
: ss.
)

COMES NOW Millis M. Anderson, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as
follows:
1.

I am a legal assistant for the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., and have been
in that capacity for more than 6 years.

2.

I worked on the Pam Stephens divorce matter on a regular basis during the time she
was represented by this office. In that capacity I had many contacts with Ms.
Stephens in the course of her case, including in-person visits at the office and
telephone calls.
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3.

At no time was I ever concerned about Ms. Stephens ability to understand or
respond to anything going on in her case or communications with this office.

4.

She was certainly articulate and well able to understand any communication with her
and respond appropriately with questions or answers, depending on the occasion and
the material to be communicated.

5.

As a matter of fact, she did not hesitate to comment on exactly what she wanted, and
what she expected.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

L/~!;~

j
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Millis M. Anderson
/) L'

/-A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this c{ '] ~ day of June, 2007.

Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: /() . J / -J 0 10
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JOHN PRIOR
Law Office of John Prior
16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, ID 83651
Telephone: (208) 465-9839
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 06-14241

)

AFFIDAVIT OF KELLI
M. WALTS

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
: ss.
)

COMES NOW Kelli M. Walts being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
I.

I am the Receptionist and Billing Clerk for the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood,
Chtd., and have been in that capacity for more than 8 years.

2.

As the Receptionist I spoke with Pam Stephens on her divorce matter on a regular
basis during the time she was represented by this office and saw her when she came
into the office.

3.

I do not recall any instance either in person or over the phone when Ms. Stephens did
not seem to understand any communication with this office.
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She was able to

articulate

regarding the progress on her

and what contact or

information she wanted from the attorney handling her case. Although she was often
impatient, at no time was I ever concerned about Ms. Stephens' ability to understand
or respond to anything going on in her case or communications with this office.
4.

Ms. Stephens was well able to understand any communication with her and respond
appropriately with questions or answers, depending on the occasion and the material
to be communicated.

5.

I saw her bring in papers and documentation and she seemed to know exactly what
she was bringing in and what those documents meant.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

KeU M. Walts
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me

this::..J'~ day of July, 2007.
~J

.
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JUN 2'~ 2008
JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB#5344
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Telephone (208) 465-9839
Facsimile (208) 465-9834

J. DAVIO NAVARRO, Clerk
By,). EARLE
DEPUTY

. Jrney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD, and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

----------------------------)
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his
attorney, JOHN PRlOR, and hereby presents this Motion to Reconsider pursuant to LR.C.P. 11
(a)(2)(B) and respectfully requests this court reconsider its prior ruling denying Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 10, 2008.

This motion is supported by the Affidavit

submitted herewith. The basis for the motion is that the Plaintiff has not provided nor has the
Plaintiff provided any medical expert that has made a determination that the Plaintiff was
incompetent and thus unable to understand the legal proceedings in the divorce in Stephens v.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - PAGE I

Stephens. That discovery responses attached herewith confirm Plaintiff presently has no medical
expert that can aid Plaintiff in establishing her claim of incompetence.

DATED this

7f1

(...---day of June, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

c~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _~ day of June, 2008, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Continue was delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Erik Clark
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2504
Eagle, 10 83616
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120
Boise, 1083705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

MOTION TO RECONSIDER - PAGE 2

(
(
(

) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
) Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail

~Facsimile

( )
( )
( )
\s,L)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsim'

)UN.24.2008

11=48AM
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CHARLES C. CRAFTS rSB # 7070
CRAFTS LAW INC.

JUN 2 % 2008

Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 8370S
Phone: (208) 367~ 1749
Facsimile: (208) 389~2109

J. DAVID NAVARRO CI ark
8
yJ. EARLE

J

DEPUTY

Attomey for Defendant: Dennh J. SIlDu
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF mE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNIS SALLAZ and

Case No. CV OC 06-14241

AFFIDA VlT OF CHARLES C.
CRAFTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

SCOTT GATEWOOD
Defendant.

ST ATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
Charles C. Crafts, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That I am the attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz in the above-entitled action.

2. That during the discovery process, I propounded requests for admissions on the Plaintiff.
3. That in my Request for Admission No 10, I propounded the following Request and received

the following response from the Plaintiff:

a. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit th.at you have never been
diagnosed by a medical professional as incompetent to understand legal proceedings.
b. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Objection, relevance.
AFFIDAVIT 0,., CHARLES C.CRAFTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RJo:CONSIDER·l

Jt.

NO. 172

P.2

4. That this request was answered on December 4th, 2007, and that the Plaintiff has not filed
any supplemental discovery, or provided a reason why this request is irrelevant.
5. That allegations 14 and 15 of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint specifically state that the
Plaintiffwas incompetent during the period of time that she entered into her divorce.

6, That I have included a true and correct copy of the discovery responses I received.
7. That I have read the same and know the contents thereof and that the same are true as I
verily believe.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day of June, 2008.

AFFlDAvrr 0 .." CHARLES C. CRAFTS IN SIJPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER· 2
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Eric R. Clark. ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW UROU P
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830.8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
PlaiJltift~

v.

)
)

)
)
)

)
)

SALLAl & GA TEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS St\LLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

Cilse No.~ CV OC ()614241

PLAINT[FF'S RESPONSE TO
DEfENDANT SALLAZ' FIRST
REQUEST fOR ADMISSIONS

}
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and according to Rules 36(a), IRCP hereby provides the
following objections responses to Detfmdant Sallaz' First Request for Admissions to the
Plaintitf

RESPONSE TO REQUEST fOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Please admit that YOli have not tiled a motion to
set aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 1 D.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. ): Objection. Relevance. While the
Plaintiff admits the factual allegation that the Plaintiff has not filed a motion to set aside the
C"J

12/4/2007 3:53:53

NO.172
P.4
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Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 J D, the Plaintiff objects to this
Reqllest as irreJevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, and as not being
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
r-h

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Please admit tbat you have failed to fully mitigate
your damages, if any, by nOt tiling a motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in
Case No. CV DR03-0115ID.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO- 3: Please admit that YOll have not filed a motion to
modify the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-011510.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3: Objection. Relevance. While the
Plaintiff admits the taenlal allegation that the Plaintiff has /lot tiled a motion to modify the
Judgment and Decree of Divorce III Case No. CV DR 03·01-151 D. the Pfaintiff ~jects. to this.
Request as i'ielevant to the subject matter involved in the pellding action, and as not being
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Please admit that you have failed to fl.llly mitigate
your damages, if any, by not tiling a motion to modify the Judgment and Decl'ee of Divorce ill
Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: DeilY.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSrON NO.5: Please admit that YOli \-\Jere present in the
COlll1room on August 5, 2004, when the judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered Case No.
CV DR03·01 151 D.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST fOR ADMISSION NO.5: Admit the allegation that the Plaiiniff
was in COW! on August 5, 2004, but denies the judgment or decree was "entered" at that time_
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Please admit that you were placed under oath by
Judge Day on August 5, 2004 ill Case No. CV DR 03·01151 D.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Please admit that once you were under oath, you
informed Judge Day that yOll had reviewed the terms ofrhe divorce decree in Case No. CV DR
03-0 Il51 D with your attorney, and that you did not have any questions regarding the terms of
the divorce.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: TIle Plaintiff objection to this
request to the extent that it suggests or implies that the Plaintiff initialed allY cOllversation with
Judge Day. TI,e Plaintiff will admit that she responded affirmatively to Judge Day's questions,
as instnlcted by her counsel prior to the hearing.
[ "1
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Please admit that YOLI produced, in your OWJl
handwriting, the documents attached herein as Exhibits A & B.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Exhibit A, Admit. Exhibit S,
o~jec!iol1, the Plaintiff does not recall

Objection, relevance. Additionally, without waiving this
drafting this note and therefore denies its authenticity.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Please admit that Dennis SalJaz did not assist, or consult
YOli in allY manner in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Deny. AOtf, ....

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.1 0: Please admit that you have never been diagnosed
by a medical pmfessionaJ as incompetent to understand legal proceedings.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. to: Objection, relevance.

REQUEST fOR ADMISSION NO. II: Please admit that YOll waited nearly two yeal's
from the time YOllr calise of action accrued to tile this lawsuit.
'--/

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADM (SSrON NO. J 1: Objection: Relevance. Without
waiving the objection, the Plaintiff tiled this action within 13 months after the Defendants
withdrew from representing hel' in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 ID, and therefore denies the factual
allegation as well.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Please admit that, initially, you tiled this lawsuit
pro sa, or without an attorney.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Objection: Relevance.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Please admit that any amount of money you
receive in this case, if any, may be commllility property.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. )3: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Please admit that Gary Stephen may be entitled
to a portion of the proceeds, ifan)" ifyoll were successful in this case.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Deny.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Please admit that Dennis Sallaz was not the
senior attorney responsible for supervising Defendant Scott Gatewood during the time of yo til'
divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION SO. 15: Deny,
[

.
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DA TED this 4th day of December, 2007.

THE REAL ESTATE LAWGROUP

ERIC R. CLARK, ISS #4697
Attomey for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of December 2007. I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a tme and con'eet copy of the foregoing to the following:
JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue SOllth. Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 8365/

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

Attol11ey for Sa/laz &, Gatewood, CHTD.,
And Scott Gatewood

CHA.RLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LA W, INC

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise. 10 !:<3705

Attomey for Dennis Sallaz.

F.ric R, Clark
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J. DAVID NAVARRO ("".",
I,
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8y KATHY J. SIEHl.

DEPUTY

Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, 1083616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,
v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

PLAI NTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL
MEMORANDUM

)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files her
pre-trial memorandum.
I.

ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
a. Legal Malpractice (Negligence).
a. Duty
b. Breach
PLAINTwr's PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - I
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c. Causation
d. Damages
b. Breach of Contract.
a. Existence of a contractual relationship
b. Breach
c. Damages
/I.

CONTESTED FACTS
a. Whether the Defendants' conduct constituted legal malpractice.
b. Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages and if so, the nature and extent of
these damages.

/II.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
Whether a judge or Jury should decide issues relevant to the divorce case as
a judge not a jury would have decided those issues in the underlying divorce
action,
a. The amount and duration of spousal maintenance,
b, The equitable division of property.

IV.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES,
a. The admission of medical records. Based on the discovery proceedings,
the Plaintiff believes the Defendants will attempt to introduce medical
records by asking the Plaintiff to authenticate these documents, As the
Plaintiff did not create the documents and has no knowledge as to
whether the medical information contained therein is accurate, the Plaintiff
PLAINTJlT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2
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cannot authenticate these records and the Defendants are required to
present the custodians or the doctors who created the documents for
proper authentication.
V.

AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS.
a. None.

VI.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LAW.
The circumstances of this case require the determination as to whether the Court

or jury should consider and decide issues raised in the divorce proceedings.
1. Spousal Maintenance. A court, not a jury, appears to have sole authority to
consider and grant spousal maintenance according to Idaho Code 32-705.
Idaho Code 32-705 MAINTENANCE.
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance
order if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable
needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment.
·2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such
periods of time that the court deems just, after considering all
relevant factors which may include:
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance,
including the marital property apportioned to said spouse, and said
spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to
enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment;
(c) The duration of the marriage;
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance;

PLAINTlrr's PRE-TRIAL MEMOR/\NDUM - 3
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(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance;
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse;
(g) The fault of either party.

The Plaintiff believes that during the trial, she is entitled to present evidence to
support her claim for spousal maintenance to the Court without the jury present. If the
Court rules that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, the Court would then instruct the
Jury that it has decided the amount and duration of spousal maintenance in accordance
with the criteria listed in Idaho Code 32-705. The Court would then instruct the Jury
that it is their duty to determine whether or not the Defendants' failure to obtain spousal
maintenance constituted legal malpractice. Alternatively, if the Court rules that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to maintenance, then that issue is resolved.
2. Community property distribution. The same issue arises regarding the
distribution of the community property.
32-712 COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND HOMESTEAD -- DISPOSITION.
In case of divorce by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction,
the community property and the homestead must be assigned as follows:
1. The community property must be assigned by the court in such
proportions as the court, from all the facts of the case and the
condition of the parties, deems just, with due consideration of the
following factors:
(a) Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a
substantially equal division in value, considering debts, between the
spouses.

PLAINTIrr'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 4
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(b) Factors which may bear upon whether a division shall be equal, or
the manner of division, include, but are not limited to:
(1) Duration of the marriage;
(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that
the court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such
agreement;
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income,
vocational skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse;
(4) The needs of each spouse;
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to
maintenance;
(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party; and
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security,
civil service, military and railroad retirement benefits.
***

Again, the Plaintiff believes that the Court shoud consider and resolve all
issues relating to the distribution of community property, and if that figure is
different that the figure used in the divorce proceedings to value the property, the
Court would instruct the Jury that it has calculated what it believes is the proper
distribution and if that figure indicates the Plaintiff was entited to receive more
value in community property than she actually received when represented by the
Defendants, then the Court would instruct the jury that it is their duty to
determine if the Defendants' conduct resulted in the Plaintiff receiving less of the
value of community property then she was entitled.

PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 5

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July, 2008.
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP

Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of July, 2008, I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, 10 83705

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric R. Clark

PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 6
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,
v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM

)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files her
pre-trial memorandum.

I.

ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
a. Legal Malpractice (Negligence).
a. Duty
b. Breach
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 1

c. Causation
d. Damages
b. Breach of Contract.
a. Existence of a contractual relationship
b. Breach
c. Damages
II.

CONTESTED FACTS
a. Whether the Defendants' conduct constituted legal malpractice.
b. Whether the Defendants breached their contract with the Plaintiff.
c. Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages and if so, the nature and extent of
these damages.

III.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
Whether a judge or Jury should decide issues relevant to the divorce case as
a judge not a jury would have decided those issues in the underlying divorce
action.
a. The amount and duration of spousal maintenance.
b. The equitable division of property.

IV.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES.
a. The admission of medical records. Based on the discovery proceedings,
the Plaintiff believes the Defendants will attempt to introduce medical
records by asking the Plaintiff to authenticate these documents. As the
Plaintiff did not create the documents and has no knowledge as to
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2

whether the medical information contained therein is accurate, the Plaintiff
cannot authenticate these records and the Defendants are required to
present the custodians or the doctors who created the documents for
proper authentication.
V.

AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS.
a. None.

VI.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LAW.
Due to the Court's ruling on July 29, 2008 in which the Court stated the trier of

fact would decide all issues presented at the trial, regardless of whether the Court
would have decided certain issues in the divorce proceedings, the Plaintiff withdraws
this argument.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 1st day of August, 2008.
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP

Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August, 2008, I caused to be served in
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, 10 83705

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

/.
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Eric R. Clark
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, 1083616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN

)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

)
Plaintiff,
v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE
RE: EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL
CONDUCT

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files this
Motion in Limine to exclude evidence at trial.
ARGUMENT
During the discovery phase of this case the Defendants have made it abundantly
clear they intend to employ character assignation as a prominent strategy in their

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT - 1
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defense. The Plaintiff objects to this tactic and seeks to exclude any evidence of illegal
activity as that evidence is not relevant, and if it is relevant, its prejudicial effect
outweighs its relevance.
1. Relevance.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these
rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.

This case involves a "case within a case" and the underlying case was a divorce
proceeding. Neither party sought a "fault" type divorce, and each pled they were
seeking a divorce bases on "irreconcilable differences." Evidence of any illegal conduct
by either party to the divorce would therefore be irrelevant. As any alleged illegal
conduct would have been irrelevant in the divorce proceeding, it is equally irrelevant in t
his case.
2. Undue Prejudice. "Even if relevant to a permissible purpose, evidence of
uncharged misconduct is subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 403 if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." "The determination of
whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court." Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith,
137 Idaho 480, 486, 50 P.3d 975 (2002) (Internal cites omitted) (Emphasis added).
In this case, the Defendant will attempt to introduce evidence of the Plaintiff's
alleged use of illegal substances. While the Plaintiff contends such evidence is clearly

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT - 2

irrelevant, it is also extremely prejudicial. That prejudice clearly outweighs any minimal
relevance and should therefore be excluded.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court GRANT this motion in its entirety and
Order the exclusion of any evidence of the Plaintiffs alleged use of illegal substances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 6th day of August, 2008.

THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP

Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of August, 2008, I caused to be served in
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, 1083705

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric R. Clark
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CHARLES C, CRAFTS ISB # 7070
CRAFTS LAW INC.
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard, Ste, 120
Boise) ID 83705
Phone: (208) 367-1749
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109

.1

·1

Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz

IN THE FOURTH JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Case No. CV OC 06-14241

Plaintiff:
VS.

MOTION TO REMOVE BOB
WALLACE AS GUARDIAN

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNIS SALLAZ and
SCOTT GATEWOOD

AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS
GUARDIAN DURING TRIAL

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendants, DENNIS SALLAZ, by and through his counsel of
record, CHARLES CRAFTS, and pursuant to

I.e.

66-322 and LR.C.P. 17 hereby moves this

Court for an Order removing Bob Wallace as the Guardian in this case. In the alternative, the
Defendants seek an Order In Limine to keep the Plaintiff from referring to Bob vVallace as her
guardian during trial.
Respectfully sublnitted this ~ day of August, 2008.

Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of August, 2008, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LA\V GROUP
P.O. Box. 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
John Prior
Law Offices of John Prior
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Namp~ Idaho 83651
Attorney for Sal/a;; & Gatewood, CHTD.
And Scott Gatewood
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Attorney for Defendant Dezmis 1. Sallaz
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CHARLES C. CRAFT'S 1SB # 7070
CRAFTS LAW INC.
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Phone: (208) 367-1749
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109
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Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA 1<.. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Case No. CV OC 06-14241

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REMOVE BOB

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNIS SALLAZ and
SCOTT GATEWOOD

WALLACE AS GUARDIAN

AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS
GUARDIAN DURING TRIAL

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendants, DENNIS SALLAZ, by and through his counsel of
record, CHARLES CRAFTS, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian.

1.

I.e. § 66-322 SETS OUT CERTAIN FACTORS THAT ARE INSTRUCTIVE AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT A GUARDIAN SHOULD BE APPOINTED
Idaho Code § 66-322 addresses the issue of appointing a guardian for purposes of
medical treatment, and it lays out very specific standards for the appointment of a Guardian. It
states in pertinent part:
MEMORANlJUM IN SUPPORT Of MOTION TO ~EMOVE nOB WALLACE AS CUARDIAN AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS
GUARDIAN DUnINGTRIAL-1

(a) Proceedings for the appointment of a guardian of a mentally ill
person may be commenced by the filing 0 f a written petition with a
court of competent jurisdiction by a friend, relative, spouse or guardian
of the proposed patient, by a licensed physician, licensed clinical
psychologist, prosecuting attorney, or other public official of a
municipality, county or of the state of Idaho, or by the director of any
facility in which such patient may be.
(b) The petition shall state the name and last known address of the
proposed patient; the name and address of either the spouse, next of
kin or friend of the proposed patient; whether a guardian of the
proposed patient has been previously appointed under the laws of this
or any other state and, if so) the name and address of the guardian and
the circumstances of such appointment; and a precise statement
showing that the proposed patient is mentally il~ that treatment is
available for such illness, and that the proposed patient lacks capacity
to make infurmed decisions about treatment.
eC) Any such petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of a
licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist stating that the
nhysician or psychologist has personally examined the proposed
gatient within the last fourteen (14) days and is of the opinion: (i)
that the proposed patient is mentally ill (in that in the absence of
treatment the immediate prognosis is for major distress of the
proposed gatient which will result in serious mental or physical
deterioration of the proposed patient, (iii) that treatment is
available which is likely to avoid serious mental or physical
deterioration of the proposed patient, and (j,v) that the proposed
uatient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about
treatment; or by a written statement by the physician or
n,wchologist that the proposed patient bas refused to submit to an
examination.

(d) Upon receipt of a petition, the court shall within forty-eight
(48) hours appoint anbther licensed physician or licensed clinical
psychologist to make a personal examination of the proposed
patient or if the proposed patient has not been examined, th~
court shall appoint two (2l licensed physicians or licensed clinical
psychologists to make individual personal examinations of the
proposed gatient and :rnay order the proposed patient to submit to
an immediate examination. Within seventy-two (72) hours, the
physician or psychologist shall file with the court certificates
described in subparagraph (e) above. if necessary.
I
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(e) Upon receipt of such petition and certificates, the court shall
appoint a time and place .fur hearing not more than seven (7) days from
receipt of such certificates and thereupon give written notice to the
proposed patient. The notice shall include a copy of the petition and
certificates and notice ofthe proposed. patient's right to be represented
by an attorney, or if indigent, to be represented by a comt~appointed
attorney. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall also be
given to the petitioner. Emphasis Added.
The Statute is instntctive as to when a guardian may be appointe~ but the following
factors seem to be the most important:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

that the proposed patient is mentally ill,
that in the absence of treatment the immediate prognosis is for major distress of
the proposed patient which will result in serious mental or physical deterioration
of the proposed patient,
that treatment is available which is likely to avoid serious mental or physical
deterioration of the proposed patient, and
that the proposed patient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about
treatment ...

Obviously, none ofthis information was provided to the Court, so the appointment of a
guardian was inappropriate. Additionally, we have testimony from an expert stating that a
person who is invo luntarily committed to a mental hospital because of suicidal thoughts should
not be presumed to be incompetent to understand legal proceedings. In fact, suicidal thoughts
are quite common - especially during times of high stress,
2.

THE PLAINTIFF NOW ADMITS THAT SHE IS MENTALLY COMPETENT TO
UNDERSTAND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.
The fullowing excerpts are taken from Ms. Stephen's discovery responses filed on July 7,
2008:
a. Pam will confirm that no medical care providers have been retained or paid for an
opinion that Pa1111acked "mental competency to understand legal proceedings."
b. Pam pled that she was taking prescribed medication on August 5, 2004 that she believed
impaired her judgment and ability to comprehend the legal proceedings. Pam has not
MEMORANOUM IN SUl'l'ORT OF MonON TO REMOVli: BOB W ALLACf.; AS GUARDlA!'! ANDIOR NOT R.EFER TO HJM AS
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asserted as tIus Interrogatory suggests that she suffered some diagnosed condition that
impaired her "mental competency."
Apparently, the only reason why Ms. Stephen's mental capacity is even at issue is
because the Plaintiff now claims that she should have been given a higher award of spousal
maintenance. Consequently, her mental condition does not impair her ability to understand the
legal proceedings, so a guardian is unnecessary.
3.

ROBERT WALLACE IS INAPPROPRIATE AS A GUARDIAN BECAUSE HE WAS
ORIGINALLY HIRED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS FOR THE PLAINTIFF
On Apri116, 2007, Robert Wallace was listed

as an expert witness for the Plaintiff After

his review of the case, Mr. Wallace Inade the fullowing findings:
A. Opinion: Mr. Wallace will testify that the conduct of the Defendants fell below the
standard of care and conduct as follows:
1. The Defendants failed to recognize or appreciate the need to obtain a
guardian to protect Pam Stephen's interests in the divorce after her
disclosure of her mental conditions.
2. The Defelldants failed to investigate the disclosed mental conditions or
contact any treating physician to determine what effect these mental
conditions had on Pam Stephen's ability to understand and comprehend
legal proceedings.
Thereafter, on January 1,2007, Mr. Wallace filed an affidavit with this court stating that
he could serve as the guardian in this case, and he was appointed. There does not appear to be
any case law on point regarding this issue, but it seems improper that someone hired to work as
an expert witness is later entrusted with the position of guardian. On its face, there are several
potential conflicts of interest.
A. A guardian should make infurmed decisions on behalf of their ward, regardless of
what the potential consequences may be. Because Mr. Wallace was retained as an
expert witness, his view 0 f the facts may be different than a neutral detached
guardian.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 0., MOTION TO REMovEDOB WA'.LACE AS GUARDIAN AND/OR NOT REF~"R TO HIM AS
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B. A guardian hired as an expert witness may be more willing to favor the opinion
and viewpoints of the side that initially hired him.
C. Mr. Wallace has already stated his opinion of the case, so it may be difficult for
defense counsel to deal with him at arm's length.
D. As a guardian, Mr. Wallace literally steps into the shoes of Ms. Stephen as the
Plaintiff in this case. Necessarily, it may be in Ms. Stephen's best interest to have
a guardian who WaS not previously retained as an expert in her own case. Once
again, someone looking at this case without any preconceived notions may have a
very different outlook than someone who was originally hired to testify on behalf
of one party.
In making this argument, the defense is not asserting that rvtr. Wallace or Mr. Clark have
done anything improper in this case. Rather, we are stating that there is a potential conflict of
interest in having Mr. Wallace as the guardian.

4.
IF MR. WALLACE CONTINUES AS THE GUARD!AJ.~ IN THIS CASE, THE
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO REFER TO mM AS HER GUARDIAN
Admitting evidence of that Mr. Wallace is the guardian in this case is irrelevant.

"Relevant

Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the eXlStence of any fact that is of
consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. Obviously, the Plaintiff will assert at trial that the Defendants
should have had a guardian appointed on behalf of Ms. Stephen. If Mr. Wallace is introduced as
Ms. Stephen's guardian, a jury may :infer that the Defendants should have requested a guardian
simply because one was appointed in this case.
Next, even ifthe presence of a guardian is relevant, the probative value of such evidence
is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect it would have on the Defendant. Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger a f unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jtrry, or by considerations
MEMORANDUM IN SUl'{'ORT OF MonON TO REMOVE
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Bon WALLACE AS GUARD JAN AND/OR NOT REFER TO IHM AS

of undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. l.RE. 403. Once
again, introducing Mr. Wallace as the guardian is extremely prejudicial to the defense, and has
absolutely no probative value whatsoever for the Plaintiff.
4,

CONCLUSION

For the f'Oregoing reasons, we would respectfully request that Mr. Wallace be removed as
the guardian in this case, or in the alternative, that he not be introduced as the guardian for Ms.
Stephen during trial.
Respectfully submitted this

0

day of August, 2008.

Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
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day of August) 2008, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing docwnent by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jolm Prior
Law Offices of John Prior
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Attorney for Sallaz & Gatel1!Ood, CHTD.
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U.S, Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
CMlECF

[]
[]
[]
[~
[]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
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And Scott Gate'WOod
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Attorney for Defendant DelUlis 1. Sallaz
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, 1083616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,
v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and scon
GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241

)
)

PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF
RE: RELEVANT EVIDENCE
AND
REQUEST FOR CONTINUING
OBJECTION

)
)
)
)
)

ARGUMENT
In an effort to get the train back on the tracks, the Plaintiff files this Memorandum
of Law concerning the scope of relevant evidence at trial.
The Plaintiff sought to narrow the relevant issues at trial to 1) the Defendants'
conduct regarding the valuation of the Crescent Rim home, and 2) the Defendants'
failure to account for payment of the judgment from community funds. The only relevant

PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF RE : RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND REQUEST FOR CONTINUING
OBJECTION - 1

•

evidence thereafter would address the calculation and value of the community estate in
light of these two factors.
Despite these seeming limited issues, the Defendants are attempting to conduct
a divorce trial and to introduce evidence that the Plaintiff is somehow at fault and
therefore the Court would have allocated her less than she deserved when the
community estate was divided. This contention however, that fault is a relevant factor in
determining the "equitable division" of community, is not supported by statue or case
law.
"Unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise, the court in a divorce
action is required to make a substantially equal division in value, considering debts, of
the community property between the spouses." Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970,9712,88 P.3d 1210 (2004). Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85,822 P.2d 982 (1991); IDAHO
CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (1996). (Emphasis added).
Additionally, "Idaho Code § 32-712 specifically addresses how community
property is to be divided. This section calls for an equal division of community property
unless there are "compelling reasons" to do otherwise. The section lists a number of
factors that the court may consider in determining the property division:

(1) Duration of the marriage;
(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that the
court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement;
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational
skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse;
(4) The needs of each spouse;
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF RE: RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND REQUEST FOR CONTINUING
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(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party; and
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, civil
service, military and railroad retirement benefits.
Under this statute, the trial court has the discretion to fashion a just division of the
community property." Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,333,900 P.2d 807 (1995),
citing Ross v. Ross, 117 Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d 1139, 1145 (1990); and Shurtliffv.
Shurtliff, 112 Idaho 1031,1034,739 P.2d 330, 333 (1987).
During this trial, the Court overruled the Plaintiff's relevance objection to
testimony regarding the Plaintiffs alleged "boyfriend." The Plaintiff renews this
objection as "fault" is not a relevant criterion when considering the statutory distribution
of community assets.
Additionally, while the Defendants' argue that if the Plaintiff was somehow
"wasting" community property, then the Court could fashion some type of relief in the
form of an inequitable distribution, that contention is also irrelevant in light of the limited
issues presented for trial.

If the Plaintiff prevails, the value of the community estate will

change in relation to the increased value of the Crescent Rim home and based on the
proper accounting for the pre-decree payment of a $28,000.00 judgment from
community funds. It does not get much simpler than that.
When the Plaintiff provided the Court with her estimation of the length of the trial,
she did so intending to present evidence to support her limited claims. However, if
these Defendants want to retry the entire divorce proceeding, which they apparently are
pursuing, then this trial is going to take much longer and involve the introduction of a
substantial amount of otherwise irrelevant evidence.

PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF RE: RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND REQUEST FOR CONTINUING
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of August, 2008.
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP

Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of August, 2008, I caused to be served
in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

Hand Delivered

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, 1083705

Hand Delivered

Eric R. Clark
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.J. O/WID NAVARRO, CIerI<
ByAlYKE
DEPUTY

JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB#5344
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Telephone (208) 465-9839
Facsimile (208) 465-9834

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD, and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
PURSUANT TO IRCP II(a)(2) B

)

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his
attorney, JOHN PRIOR, and hereby presents this Motion to Reconsider pursuant to LR.C.P. II
(a)(2)B and respectfully requests this court reconsider its prior ruling. A Memorandum in
Support of Motion supports this Motion for Reconsideration submitted herewith and as follows:
I.

The court did not reduce the damages assessed against Scott Gatewood in the
amount of $10,000 for the separate property of Mr. Stephens for the Beach
Street residence.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER - PAGE I

2.

The court should not include the $28,000 indebtedness for the lien was paid
prior to the divorce against Mr. Gatewood in determining damages.

3.

The Defendant represents that it is his belief that the appraisal experts for the
defense determined the Crescent Rim Property to be valued at between
$375,000 to $400,000. That the court should take the testimony of defense
witnesses as to value of the property. Further that the court in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law noted a range of $275,000 to $400,000 as
opposed to what defense believes was a range of$375,000 to $400,000.

4.

That the court reconsiders its prior ruling regarding the applicability of Heinz
v. Bauer 2008 ID R0128.004 based upon its Findings of Fact that Ms Stephens

was not incompetent.

y.-:.-

DATED this

-.J2 day of October, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
\;;:::-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

f l day of October, 2008, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration was delivered by the method indicated below and
addressed to the following:
Erik Clark
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109
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) Hand Delivered
.,2vernight Mail
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) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
) Hand Delivered
) J)vernight Mail

~rFacsimile

OCT 1 7 2008
.J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
8yA. LYKE
DEPUTY

JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB #5344
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113
Nampa, ID 83651
(208) 465-9839
Fax (208) 465-9834
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0614241

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

SALLAZ & GATWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
PURSUANT TO IRCP 11 (a)(2)B

)
)

)

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his
attorney, JOHN PRIOR, and hereby presents this Memorandum in Support of Motion For
Reconsideration pursuant to LR.C.P. II (a)(2)B.
In the court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Defendant
respectfully requests that the court reconsider its decision and its factual findings as follows:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TlON- Page I

1.

That the court consider reducing the damages assessed against Scott Gatewood in
the amount of $1 0,000 for the separate property of Mr. Stephens for the Beach Street
residence. This request is based upon the decision in Bliss v. Bliss 127 Idaho 170,
898 P2d 1081 (1995). In Bliss, Id, the court noted that a conveyance by one party to
another such as in the present case creates a separate property interest. That it is then
the burden of the party objecting to that separate property characterization to present
evidence to overcome that presumption. Bliss states in pertinent part;

"Because the deed was in writing, signed by the grantor, and included the name and
address of the grantee, it constituted a valid conveyance oflegal title to real property. I.C. § 55601 ;(1'nl) see, e.g., Erb v. Kohnke,

,337,824 P.2d 903,912 (CL App. 1992). In

cases such as this, I.C. § 32-906(2) creates a presumption that the conveyed property is
separate:
(2) Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate
estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge the deed or
other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the provisions of section 32-912, Idaho
Code; ....
Under this statute, the forty-eight acres is presumed to be Althea's sole and separate property.
Pursuant to Rule 30 I of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Gordon then had the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, although it remained Althea's burden
of persuasion to demonstrate that the forty-eight acres was separate. The effect of the statutory
presumption under Rule 301 is that the party in whose favor the presumption operates is
relieved from having to adduce further evidence of the presumed fact until the opponent
introduces substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the fact. Bongiovi v. Jamison.
, 738, 718 P.2d 1172, 1176 (l986)".Bliss pg 174.
Ms. Stephens, Ann Shepard and Scott Gatewood all testified that it was Gary Stephens separate
property. At no time was there testimony that would overcome the presumption ofthe Beach
Street property as separate property. Counsel for the Defendant has a recollection that the court
examined the Quit Claim deed during the trial. If the court is going to allow Plaintiffto recharacterize a debt form community to separate as in the case of the $28,000 debt, Defendant
would request that the court consider that the Beach Street property be characterized as a
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- Page 2

separate property and that Ms. Stephens award be reduced by $10,000 which represents an
increase in the overall property equalization in which she was not entitled to. The Bliss case
was precedent at the time of the divorce.

2. That the court reconsider its ruling that the $8,000 debt paid prior to the divorce was
a separate debt. There was no testimony in the present case that determined the
source ofthe funds that paid that $28,000 debt. Mr. Stephens did not come forward
and testifY the source of funds in paying off that debt. There was no witness that
testified to what source of funds we were used to satisfY that debt. The court cannot
speculate to a source. Further, the court should consider Mr. Gatewood's testimony
and we would respectfully request that the court reconsider that divorce settlements
do not always allow for an equal distribution or equal determination of what is
separate and what is community assets. This would require the court to examine the
mind set of all parties back in 2004. The very fact that there is a dispute as to
characterization and that the court had to recalculate the settlement in terms of
characterization of property and amount due should suggest to the court that divorce
settlements are by their nature an exercise in speculation as to how to distribute
property. As such we would respectfully request that the court reconsider its prior
determination and reclassifY this $28,0000 debt as community debt.
3. The Defendant represents that it is his belief that the appraisal experts for the
defense determined the Crescent Rim Property to be valued at between $375,000 to
$400,000. That the court should take the testimony of defense witnesses as to value
of the property. That the fact that Mr. Stephens placed the value at $500,000 and the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- Page 3

In conclusion Defendant respectfully request that this court reconsider its ruling that Ms.
Stephens was damaged by action of Mr. Gatewood. Further, Defendant respectfully
request that this court reevaluate its detennination of damages based upon the argument
presented herein.
DATED this

(l

r.:.day of October, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

{

') r--day of October, 2008, I caused a true copy of

the foregoing Memorandum In Support of Motion for Reconsideration to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Fax: (208)939-7136
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
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( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
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_~Facsi4

/J(b}/

0H1\JRi0R
~
I,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- Page 5

/0 ·.5ES

Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 685-2320
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,
v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,

Case No.: CV OC 0614241
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
GATEWOOD'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and hereby responds
to Defendant Gatewood's Motion to Reconsider.
ARGUMENT

1.

The Court Correctly Ruled the Beach Street Home Was Community

Property. As the Court noted in its Findings of Facts, the parties in the divorce considered the
Beach Street property as community property, notwithstanding the existence of any deed. In
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PlaintitT's Exhibit 105, Ms. Stephen presented Mr. Stephen's verified discovery responses in the
divorce case in which Mr. Stephen, when asked to identify all "Community Real Property,"
identified both the Crescent Rim home and the Beach Street property, and when asked in the
same discovery whether Mr. Stephen claimed any separate real property, Mr. Stephen replied
"None."
Additionally, Ms. Shepard, Mr. Stephen's divorce attorney, testified at trial that she
believed the parties had settled their personal property division issues at mediation, but that the
real property division was still in contention on August 5, 2004, the date scheduled for the
divorce trial. Ultimately, the parties agreed that both the Beach Street and Crescent Rim homes
were community property, despite the existence of any quit-claim deed ("2001 deed") concerning
the Beach Street home, and memorialized this agreement and their respective understandings in
the divorce decree.
In his Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Gatewood directs the Court to Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho
170, 898 P .2d 1081 (1995), and asserts the Court must consider the Beach Street home as Mr.
Stephen's separate property. This contention however ignores the facts in Bliss and the clear
wording of Idaho Code § 32-906(2).
In this case, the 200 I deed purports to convey property to Mr. Stephens, the Grantee, but
Mr. Stephens although having knowledge of the deed, either conceded the 2001 deed was
incorrect or agreed that notwithstanding the 200 I deed, the Beach Street home was community
property. Ms. Stephen under the circumstances, as Grantor, stands in the same shoes as Gordon
Bliss, who in the Bliss case sought to invalidate his deed conveying acreage to Mrs. Bliss. Had
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Mrs. Bliss, as the Grantee, agreed that the property was community, despite the deed, as Mr.
Stephen had done, the validity of the deed in Bliss would have been in question, just like it was
in this case. Consequently, to have prevailed on this issue in the trial, the Defendants would
have had to present Mr. Stephen's testimony that he believed the 2001 deed was valid and
enforceable. However, Ms. Stephen presented evidence at trial that Mr. Stephens believed and
understood the Beach Street home was community property and ultimately even after Mr.
Stephens was aware of the 2001 deed agreed to divide the Beach Street home as ifit were still
community property.
Moreover, Judge Day was clear and unequivocal in the Decree and directed Ms. Stephen
to quit-claim her community interest in the Beach Street home to Mr. Stephen (Decree, page 2.
para. 3). If Mr. Stephen or his Counsel Ms. Shepard believed the decree was not accurate, they
should have petitioned the Court for a correction. While Bliss may apply when the Grantee
asserts an entitlement to the deed, it is not controlling when the Grantee concedes the deed was
either erroneous or that the real property remained community property despite the deed.
Mr. Gatewood also argues that the Court should grant this motion because the Court "recharacterized a debt from community to separate as in the case of the $28,000.00 debt." Once
again, Mr. Gatewood is incorrect. The record confirmed that Mr. Stephen paid the $28,000.00
community debt from community funds while the parties were married (Plaintiffs Exhibit 117).

It was error for Mr. Stephen to deduct the $28,000.00 community debt from the community
equity, when that debt no longer existed. The Court correctly increased the value of the
community estate by $28,000.00 to reflect the fact the $28,000.00 debit that Mr. Stephens
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received for a community debt that no longer existed was error. The Court did not, as Mr.
Gatewood contends, somehow "re-classify" the judgment debt from community to separate.
Finally, if the Court were to reverse and rule the 2001 deed as valid, the Beach Street
home would have been Mr. Stephen's separate property from August 24, 200l. Assuming this
was correct; the Decree indicates the mortgage on the Beach Street home was $860.00 per
month, and there was no evidence presented that Mr. Stephen had any separate property funds to
pay this mortgage. The community would therefore be entitled to reimbursement for the
community funds paid for the mortgage of$30,1 00.00 ($860.00 x 35 months). Mr. Stephen
would owe Ms. Stephen half of this amount, and based on the Defendant's estimate ofa $10,000
shortfall, the Defendants would actually now owe Ms. Stephen an additional $5,000.00. Ms.
Stephen however did not assert the 2001 deed was valid and enforceable, despite that she would
have been entitled to reimbursement, because the facts clearly establish that neither party to the
2001 deed considered it valid and to reverse would be clear error.
2.

The Court Properly Ruled Mr. Stephen Was Not Entitled To Debit The

.Judgment Lien. Defendant Gatewood asks the Court to reverse its ruling "that the $[2]8,000
debt paid prior to the divorce was a separate debt.,,1 This contention, however, ignores the actual
rul ing. Ms. Stephen argued that Mr. Stephen was not entitled to debit the judgment lien that was
paid before the decree was entered and therefore, as the Court correctly ruled, the amount of
community estate equity increased by the amount of this deduction. Once this debt was paid, it
should not have been listed on the property settlement agreement and to have given Mr. Stephen

I. Gatewood's Memo. In support of Motion for Reconsideration
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a $28,000 deduction was error.
Regarding the "source of funds" argument, contrary to Defendant Gatewood's claim, the
evidence presented at trial indicates the judgment lien was a lien against a community real
property asset, arose from a construction dispute regarding this community real property asset,
occurred during the marriage, and was ultimately paid for from community funds. We know it
was paid for from community funds because Mr. Stephen indicated in his discovery responses
that he did not have any separate property sources of income.
Finally, at trial the Defendants effectively stood in the shoes of Mr. Stephen in the
divorce proceedings. Consequently, the burden of proof and production in this case remained the
same as in the divorce action. It is the party asserting a certain classification as separate or
community to produce evidence in support of that contention. If Defendant Gatewood believed
Mr. Stephens paid the judgment lien from separate property funds as he contends, it was his
burden to support and prove this contention at trial. Mr. Gatewood, however, did not meet his
burden.
3.

The Court's Determination of the Value of the Crescent Rim Property

Should Stand. Mr. Gatewood appears to argue nothing more than the Court should believe his

appraisers and not Mr. Schultz and relics on allegations he had every opportunity to prove in
Court but failed. As the Court remembers, Ms. Shepard and Mr. Gatewood both conceded on
cross-examination that then had absolutely no evidence that Ms. Stephen was the cause of or
responsible for any alleged damage to either property, yet Mr. Gatewood now argues "Mr.
Stephens had to repair two residences damaged by Ms. Stephen and her guests."
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The Court undeniably detennined that Mr. Schultz' appraisal was more compelling,
perhaps because Mr. Schulz, unlike the Defense appraisers, actually entered the Crescent Rim
horne and viewed the inside of the residence when perfonning his appraisal. The Defendants had
every opportunity to seek access to this property so their appraisers could perform a similar
appraisal, but never pursued this avenue. Instead, Mr. Gatewood's appraisers conducted a
limited appraisal from the curb. As the Court's decision regarding the value of the Crescent Rim
horne is supported by substantial evidence, the Court's ruling should stand.
4.

Heinze v. Bauer does not require a finding the Plaintiff was incompetent.

Once again, Mr. Gatewood's interpretation the application of judicial estoppel is incorrect. As
the Court cited in its denial of the Defendant's motions for summary judgment and again when
the Court denied the Defendants' motion for directed verdict, competence or incompetence is not
the standard

it is what the person "charged" with knowledge actually knew.

Notwithstanding proof that Ms. Stephen was taking medications that likely affected her
cognitive functions, and her Attorney was aware of this situation, the record is clear that Mr.
Stephen believed the Crescent Rim home was worth $500,000.00 and that Mr. Gatewood did not
provide that information to Ms. Stephen. Moreover, Ms. Stephen did not know that Mr. Stephen
had paid the Crescent Rim judgment from community funds before the divorce was finalized.
Consequently, regardless of any "incompetence" issues, judicial estoppel should not apply
because Ms. Stephen simply did not know relevant and material facts when she agreed to the
property settlement. "Stated another way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not
only what a party states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should have
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known, at the time the original position was adopted." }V/cKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155,
937 P.2d 1222 (1997). There is no disputed evidence that Ms. Stephen knew or should have
know ofMr. Stephen's opinion of the value of the Crescent Rim home or that she knew or
should have know that Mr. Stephen paid the Crescent Rim judgment. As the evidence
established she did not know these facts, judicial estoppel cannot apply, and the Court has been
correct in its rulings for two years.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court DENY the Defendant's Motion to
reconsider.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 2008.

CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11 th day of November 2008, I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, IO 83705

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

Via Fax (208) 389-2109

Eric R. Clark
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WILLIAM 1. SCHWARTZ, ISB NO. 3649
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, Idaho 83705
Telephone (208) 426-9383
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263
Attorneys for the DefendantslAppellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
Plaintiff/RespondentiCross-Appellant,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
)
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD
)
DefendantslAppellants/Cross-Respondents. )

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

Civil No. CV OC 0614241

MOTION FOR STAY OF
EXECUTION ON MONEY
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, SALLAZ & GATEWOOD,
CI-ITD., DENNIS SALLAZ, and SCOTT GATEWOOD, (hereinafter collectively referred to as,
"the Appellants Sallaz & Gatewood"), by and through their attorney of record, William 1.
Schwartz, and pursuant to LR.C.P. 7(b)(3), and LA.R. 13(b)(l5) file this MOTION FOR STAY
EXECUTION ON MONEY JUDGMENT.
This motion is made for the reason that a stay of execution of the Amended Judgment
entered in the above-entitled action on February 9, 2009, The Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin,
District Judge, presiding, and all interlocutory or final judgments related to that Amended

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
ON MONEY JUDGMENT - Page 1

ORI INAL

Judgment, is necessary to preserve the status quo between the parties pending the outcome of the
appeal that is now pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, Case No. 36322-2009. The
Appellants Sallaz and Gatewood have posted a cash deposit as security for the issuance of a stay
of execution, in the amount of $53,604.06, (Cashier's Check No.

rJ.13dj():if1> which includes

the amount of the Amended Judgment plus 36% as required by rule.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of June, 2009.

~.~

Attorney for the Appellants
Sallaz & Gatewood, et al.

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the attached document was mailed or delivered via
facsimile and US Mail to the following named persons:

ERIC R. CLARK
Clark and Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone (208) 685-2320
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff/RespondentiCross-appellant

Date:

7u~

I~

.::Lpo ~

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
ON MONEY JUDGMENT - Page 3

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,
v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
.Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellants/Cross-Respondents on December 21, 2009.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants/Cross-Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Stipulation to Allow Plaintiff s Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped June 25,
2007;
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped June 26, 2007;
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped July 2,2007;
Answer to Amended Complaint, file-stamped October 16,2007;
Answer, file-stamped October 16,2007;
Verification of Answer to Amended Complaint, file-stamped October 16, 2007;
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, file-stamped September 8,
2008;
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, file-stamped October 3,2008; and
Judgment, file-stamped December 1,2008.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
l. Sallaz &- Gatewood Fee Agreement, dated June 16,2003; and
2. Letter to the DMV from Sallaz, dated June 16,2003.

-&-

DATED this

1$

day of December 2009.

~tePhen W. Kenyon,
cc: Counsel of Record

lerk

,

.

Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV OC 0614241
STIPULATION TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

)

COME NOW the respective Parties and by and through their counsel of record and
hereby agree and stipulate to allow the Plaintiffto amend her Complaint as set forth in the
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Based on this stipulation, the Parties request that the Court
approve and sign the Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint filed
contemporaneously herewith.

STIPULA TION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - I

..

Jun 25 aOO? 9:50AM
"rom: a;rn

It. o.tc

To: Jolin Prior

OFFices of John Prior

659834

Dale: 8f22I2OO7 'llMe 11:03: 14 10M

RESPECTFULLY SUDMJITED this 22nd day of June 2007.

Eric R. Clark,
For the PlaintifT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH1l~~~
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN

~4JJt

)
)

)

Plaintiff,

•

Case No.: CY OC 0614241

)

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

)

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
The Court understands that this is a matter in which it has discretion. In applying its
discretion, the Court has reviewed the record; including the proposed pleading attached to the
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and including a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties in
which the Defendants indicate they have no objection to the Motion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is
GRANTED.
ENTERED THIS

14:

day of June 2007.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - 1

:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of June, 2007, I caused to be served by
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

John Prior
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Eric R. Clark
The Real Estate Law Group
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - 2

Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697

THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Plaintiff,

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CY OC 0614241

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

As a complaint against Defendants Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Dennis Sallaz and Scott
Gatewood, plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen alleges: _
I.

Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen ("Pamela") is a resident of Ada County,

2.

Defendant SaUaz & Gatewood, Chtd., is a professional corporation authorized to

Idaho.

do business in the State of Idaho, with its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho.

Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial - I
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3.

Defendants Dennis Sallaz and Scott Gatewood are residents of Ada County, Idaho

and licensed by the Idaho State Bar to practice law in Idaho.
4.

Pamela hired Defendants to represent her in n divorce action filed by her husband

Gary Stephen in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada. The court 5cheduled this action for trial before the
Honorable David E. Day on August 5, 2004.
S.

During the initial interview with the Defendants, Pamela disclosed she believed

she was "bi-polar" and suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. She also disclosed that
she had attempted suicide.

6.

The Defendant required that Pamela review and sign an "Employment
I

Agreement" in which they represented to Pamela she had hired the "the office to represent you."
I

Thereafter. both Dennis Sallaz and G. Scott Gatewood were listed as Pamela's attorneys in
pleadings filed in the divorce case. Additionally. Defendant Sallaz was the senior attorney and
was responsible for supervising Defendant Gatewood.

7.

Pamela was very concerned about the divorce. She was suffering from the

disclosed mental conditions which required medica.l care and costly prescription medica.tions to
treat. Mr. Stephens was a pilot with UPS and as an employee benefit had great medical
insurance that was paying for Pamela'S medications and treatment, but Pam was unsure about the
future coverage after the divorce.
8.

Pamela was also concerned about future income. Pamela stayed at home to raise

the couple's daughter and only worked part-time during the twenty-five year marriage. Pamela
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believed she was entitled to spousal support due to her illness, age, limited education, and
minimal experience and asked the Defendants to seek maintenance for her.
9.

Initially, the Defendants drafted and filed a motion for temporary maintenance.

However, nothing in the record in the divorce action indicates this motion proceeded to hearing
and there is not an order indicating this motion was ever granted or denied. The Defendants told
Pamela the motion had been denied.
10.

Pamela's husband, Gary, earned approximately $250,000.00 per year from his

employment at UPS and maintained control over the couple's bank accounts. After he filed for
divorce, Gary denied Pamela access to any of his income or bank accounts, and due to her

illnesses and lack of employment, Pamela was in a dire financial situation. The Defendants,
although they were aware of this situation, required that Pamela pay a large retaiMf and did not
seek their compensation from Gary according to Idaho Code § 32 704.
w

11.

The Court set a pre-trial conference for July 19,2004 where the Defendants

appeared and informed the Court the Defendants had not had contact with Pamela "in months."

12.

On this same day, the Defendants filed a motion to withdraw stating that the

Defendants did not think it was in Pamela's "best interest" for the Defendants to continue to

represent her. However, although the Defendants filed this motion, there is no indication it was
set for heariIlS and the Defendants continued to repl'esent Pamela, despite their representation to

the Court in their motion that doing so was not in her best interests.
13.

Additionally, during the course of the divorce action. Pamela was hospitalized

due to her mental illnesses and was released from the hospital shortly before August 5, 2004, the
date of her trial.
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14.

Upon her release from the hospital in late July 2004, Pamela was prescribed

numerous drugs for the purpose of controlling her illness, which she took as prescribed. One of
the side-effects of the drugs was to render Pamela incompetent and unable to make intelligent
decisions regarding her personal affairs.
15.

Defendants were aware ofPrunela.'s hospitalization and of the drugs that had been

prescribed to her. They also knew or had reason to know that those drugs had rendered her
incompetent and unable to make intelligent decisions regarding her personal affairs.
16.

Pamela contacted the Defendants shortly before the trial date and requested they

seek to postpone the trial due to Pamela's conditions. The Defendants however refused to seek
to vacate and reschedule and told Pamela the judge would not appreciate her claim of mental
illness.
17.

The Defendants also did not request the appointment ofa guardian ad litem for

plaintiff or take any other action intended to inform the Court of Pamela's disability.
18.

Prior to the trial, the Defendants conducted minimal discovery and no
I

investigation regarding the parties' assets. The parties owned two homes; one they lived in and
one as a rental. The Defendants failed to determine the value of these properties or request an
appraisal. The Defendants advised Pamela to agree to a value of the Crescent Rim home that
was approximately $} 00,000 below the current value.
19.

Pamela had contributed separate property funds to the purchase, maintenance, and

improvements to the parties real property that were readily traceable. The Defendants did not
t

however seek credit for this separate property nor advise Pamela she was entitled to recover
compensation for this separate property in. the divorce
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20.

Gary also disclosed ajudgment of approximately $28,000.00 which he agreed to

accept as part of the distribution of property. Consequently, the Defendants agreed with this
figure and as Gary was taking this debt he was entitled to an offset from the total value of the

community assets. However, this debt was paid several months prior to the trial date from
community funds and should not have been credited to Gary.

21.

Although Pamela had disclosed her mental conditions. the Defendants failed to

obtain Pamela's medical records or contaot her treating physicians during the Defendants
representation or in any manner seek to inform themselves about these conditions.
22.

As Gary's retirement plan was an asset in the divorce, a Qualified Domestic

Relations Order C"QDRO") was necessary to order the division of the retirement account. The
Defendants failed to obtain Ii valid QDRO before wIthdrawing. Pamela had to employ other
counsel, Constance Norris, to complete the QDRO thereby ensuring Pamela would eventually
receive funds from Gary's retirement account.

COUNT I. NEGLIGENCE.
23.

Pamela hereby incorporates all facts ~d allegations previously stated as if set

forth herein.
24.

As Pamela's attorneys, the Defendants owed Pamela various duties including the

duty of competency and the duty of diligence. They also had a heightened duty as Pamela had

disclosed a disability that indicated she may have had diminished capacity,
25,

The Defendants breached these duties.
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26.

The Defendants failure to seek a postponement of the trial, to seek the appointment

of a guardian ad litem or to take other action to advise the court of Pamela's mental condition was
negligence.
27.

The Defendants failure to seek temporary or permanent maintenance and attorney

fees from Gary to pay their fees was negligence.
28.

The Defendants failure to investigate and determine the values of the parties' real

property before advising Pamela to agree to the stated value was negligence.

29.

The Defendants failure to investigate and determine the value of Pamela's

separate property and to ensure she was compensated for this separate property was negligence.
30.

The Defendants failure to investigate the existence and validity of the judgment

against the marital estate was negligence.
31.

The Defendants failure to obtain a valid QDRO before withdrav.ing was

negligence.

32.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, Pamela has

suffered damages In excess of $1 0,000.00.

PRA YER FOR RELIEF
Therefore, Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen requests the court to enter judgment
against defendants Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., and Scott Gatewood and Dennis Sallaz, jointly

and severally as follows:
1.

Awarding plaintiff judgment for such damages as ore proved at trial;

2.

Awarding plaintiff her costs and attorney fees that she incurs in the course of this

action; and

,
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3.

Granting plaintiff such other relief as the court deems just under the

circumstances.
TRIAL BY JURy

Plaintiff demands a trial by a jury of 12 on all issues as to which she has that right.
DATED this 2nd day of July 2007.
THE REAL ESTATE LA W GROUP

ERIC R. CLARK, for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of July 2001, I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a true a.nd correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF lOtIN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113

Via Fax (208) 465-9834

Nampa,ldaho 83651
Attorney for Defendants Gatewood and Sallaz and Gatewood, CHTD.

Eric R, Clark
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CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISS # 7070
CRAFTS LAW INC.
Attorney at Law
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Phone: (208) 367-1749
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109

o[) /

~

OCT 1 6 2007
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Case No. CV OC 06-14241

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNIS SALLAZ and
SCOTT GATEWOOD
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, Dennis Sallaz, and answers
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

The Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering Defendant upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
I)

This answering Defendants denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.
ANSWER TO AMENnEO COMPLAINT - I

2)
This answering Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1,2,3
and 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

3)
This answering Defendant is without sufficient infonnation to either admit or
deny the allegations set fiJrth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7,8,9,10, II, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19,20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 and therefore denies the same.
THIRD DEFENSE

This Defendant has fully performed his duties under the agreement, and the
PlaintifThas received the full consideration agreed upon, and that the transaction was carried out
in full and in accordance with the agreement.
FOURTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff is not the real party in interest as respects all or a part of this claim,
contrary to Rule 17, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
FIFTH DEFENSE

Other third persons, not in this Defendant's control, were guilty of negligent and
careless misconduct at the time of and in connection with the matters and damages alleged,
which misconduct on their part proximately caused and/or contributed to said events and
Plaintiffs resultant damages, if any.
SIXTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff has, and continues to have, the ability and opportunity to mitigate the
damages alleged with respect to the subject matter of this action, and has failed to mitigate said
damages, if any were in fact incurred.
ANSWER TO AMENIH]) COMPLAINT - 2

SEVENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff has waived, or by her conduct is estopped from asserting the causes of
action contained in his Complaint.
EIGHTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff gave her express consent to Defendant and/or co-defendant to execute
her divorce in the manner negotiated.
NINTH DEFENSE

That the plaintiff was guilty of laches and unreasonable delay in bringing this
action and in asserting any cause of action against this Defendant, and that such laches and
unreasonable delay were without good cause and substantially prejudiced this Defendant.
TENTH DEFENSE

There has been a novation between the parties resulting in accord and satisfaction
and waiver thereby releasing any claim alleged by Plaintiff herein.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE

The Plaintiff ratified the Defendant's actions by accepting the fulI benefit ofthe
divorce decree for nearly two years before bringing this lawsuit.
TWELFTH DEFENSE

That more than two (2) years have passed since Plaintiff's action for professional
malpractice accrued against this Defendant, thus, Plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-219(4).
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party to this action.

ANSWER TO AMENnEn COMPLAINT - 3

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs alleged course of action fails because of accord and satisfaction and
release. Plaintiff specifically maintained that she was capable of and understood the proceedings
and demanded the settlement terms as agreed.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE

Defendant reserves the right to assert any additional affirmative defenses and
matters in avoidance that may be disclosed in the course of additional investigation and
discovery, including without limitation, comparative negligence, statute of limitations,
waiver/estoppel, supersedinglintervening cause, negligence ofa third-party not in Defendant's
control and setoff
PRA YER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintitftake nothing by her Complaint, that
the same be dismissed, and that Defendant be awarded his costs of suit and attorney fees, and
such other and further relief as the Court deems just.
JURY DEMAND

DEFENDANT DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY.

ANSWER TO AMEN!>E!) COMPLAINT-4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Attorney/or Plaintiff'
John Prior
Law Offices of John Prior
16 1t h Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651
Attorney/or Sallaz & GateH'Ood, CHTD.
And Scott Gatewood
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16 12111 Avenue S " Suite 113
Nampa., ID 83651
(208) 465·9839 Telephone
(208) 465·9834 Faosimile

Attorney for Defondant Scott Gatewood
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIct OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAl\1ELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Plaint:ift
vs.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID" lUld
SCOTT GATEWOOD.
Defendants.

!

CASBNO. CV OC 0614241
ANSWER

!
)
)

~)

COMES NOW. the above named Defan~ SCO'IT GATEWOOD. by and through his

counsel of record, JOHN PRIOR., and hereby answers the Amended Complaint filed by the

Plal.ntiff. and admits, denies and a11eg~ as follows.
I

Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Pla.inti.1rs Amended Complaint

not specifically admitted herew.
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n
Th.o Defendant is without suffiolent information to either admit or deny the allegations set
forth in patagraph 1, therefore it is deemed denied.

m
Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragmphs 2, 3 and 4.

IV
Defendant a.dmits the allegation in paragraph S in part that the Plaintiff informed the
Defendant that she believed she was hi-polar. Defendant denies the rewaining portion of
pe.rag:raph 5.

v
Defendant admits tho allegation in paragraph 6 in part, that the firm :represented the
Plaintiff. Defendant denies the rem.ain!ng portion ofparagraph 6.

VI

Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 7.
VII
Defendant a.dmits the allegations in paragraph 8.

vm
Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 9 and 10.

IX
Defendant admits the allcgatiorul in paragraph 11.

x
Defendant admits paragraph 12 in that a Motion to Withdraw was file~ however the
Plaintiff called and we agree to continue to work. her case.
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Xl
Defendant denies Pflnlgnlph-' 13, 14, 15 and 16.

XII
Defendant admits paragrapb 17.

xm
Defendant denies paragraphs 18, 19.20,21,22.23,24.25.26.27, 2B. 29,30.31 and 32.

AFFlBMATlYE DEFEN$E§

AffIrmative D~fen.Je No, 1: The Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can bI)
granted .

.A.ffitn1ativ" Defense No, 2: The P laintiff fails to mitigate her damages.
A:ftln.nlltive DefeDse No.3: Laches.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, having made an answer to the Amended Complaint filed
herein against Defendant, prays as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be diaotissed and that the Plaintiff takes

nothing ~by;

2.

That the Defendant

~

awarded his reasonable attorneys fees and court costs

incurred herein.
3.

For such other and further relief as to the court may &eem just and propel' in the

premises.
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I ( ~ ofOotobor, 2007.

STATEOFIDAffO
County of Canyon

)
)8&.
)

scon GATEWOOD; being duly sworn upo.u oath. states as follows:
That he i5 th~ Defendant in tho foregomg action; that he has m:td the foregoing

docwnent, and the facts therein stated are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

?-'SCOTT GATEWOOD

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of October, 2007.
-f,

NOTARY~C!OR~]

Residing at: ~
My coonmission expires:
;; :3/ Zt:9 1-..5'
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OF SREVICE

~

day of October, 2007, I caused. true and

correct copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER to be delivered to the following and by tho
method indicted below:
Erik Clark

Attorney at Law
POBox 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

u.s. Mail, Postage Pxepajd
) Hand Delivered
j Overnight Mail

lJj

Facsim.ile

Fax: (208) 939-7136
Charles Crafts
Attorney at Law
410 S. OrohArd St. Suito 120
Boise, ID 83705
Fax: (208) 389-2109

JJ
(
(

u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovemi~t Mall

Facsimile
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CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISB # 7070
CRAFTS LA W INC.
Attorney at Law
4 lOS. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Phone: (208)367-1749
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109

Itl<ATHYJ. . . .
III'U1Y

Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Case No. CV OC 06-14241

Plaintiff,
vs.

VERI FICA TION OF ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNlS SALLAZ and
SCOTT GATEWOOD
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, and verifies the Answer to the Amended
Complaint as follows:
VERI FICA TION

DENNIS J. SALLAZ, being duly sworn upon oath, states as follows:
That he is the Defendant in the t()regoing action; that he has read the Answer to the
Amended Complaint, and that the tacts therein stated are true to the best of his knowledge and
belief

~
,/

VERIHCATION OF ANSWER TO AMENUE[) COMPLAI

\

J

- I

SalJaz

'

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA
,,..@.tt.I!",."'~~".!r-~ ",

This document was acknowle~ge'd befur~ me of1,Qctober 16,2007
<~

.t

,

..

,.'

/

Notary Seal, if any:

"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I~ day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing VERIFICATION OF ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT by
delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Tel: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
A uorney.lor PlaintifF

[ ]
[ ]

John Prior
Law Offices of John Prior
16 I til Avenue South, Suite I 13
Nampa, Idaho 83651
A ttorneyfor Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD.
And Scott Gate}t'Ood

[ ]
[ ]
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Hand-Delivered
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Hand-Delivered
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CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISB # 7070
CRAFTS LAW INC.
Attorney at Law
4 lOS. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705
Phone: (208) 367-1749
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
8yA. LYKE
OEPLJTY

Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. SaUaz
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
Case No. CV OC 06-14241

Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANT SALLAZ'S FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.;
DENNIS SALLAZ and
SCOTT GATEWOOD
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Dennis Sallaz by and through his attorney, Charles C. Crafts, and
presents the following proposed jury instructions.
FACTS

The attorney client relationship between Ms. Stephen and Sallaz and Gatewood began on
June 16, 2003.

See Plaintiffs exhihit lOO. Sallaz and Gatewood CHTD., was formed on

September 9, 2003.

See

P/aint~frs

exhihit 129. Ms. Stephen stipulated to the terms of the

divorce on August 5, 2004, and the Judgment and Decree of Divorce were entered on August 9,

Dctendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw -I

2004. See Plaintiff's Exhihit 103. The Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in this
case was filed on July 2, 2007; Dennis Sallaz, in his personal capacity, was not added as a
Defendant until this date.
In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Stephen alleged that "Defendant Sallaz was the senior
attorney and was responsible for supervising Defendant Gatewood." See Allegation 6. Amended

Complaint.

However, Ms. Stephen failed to provide any evidence at trial to support this

allegation. In fact, both Defendants specifically stated that Mr. Sallaz was not supervising Mr.
Gatewood at any point during this litigation. Finally, Ms. Stephen now claims that her Amended
Complaint was also meant to include partnership liability, despite the fact that it was not pled in
her Complaint - either factually or legally.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
EVEN IF DEFENDANT GATEWOOD WAS NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO SHOW THAT SHE WOULD HAVE OBTAINED A DIFFERENT RESULT
BUT FOR THE NEGLIGENCE
'1 fthe allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action
In

tort. (See Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations (1950) 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177,

1201.) The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm,
or the threat of future harm-not yet realized-does not suffice to create a cause of action for
negligence. (Walker v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 513, 517, 6 Cal.Rptr. 924;
McGregor v. Wright (1931) 117 ·Cal.App. 186, 196-198, 3 P.2d 624.) Ralphs v.

Ci~y (~f

Spirit

Lake. 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315, (1977).
Essentially, the Plaintiff failed to take into account a number of factors that Gatewood
negotiated on her behalf So, even if Defendant Gatewood was negligent, Ms. Stephen failed to
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show that, but for his negligence she would have achieved a more favorable result. A detailed
discussion 0 f these facts is presented later in this brief:

ANY CAUSE OF ACTION THE PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE IN THIS CASE DID NOT
ACCRUE UNTIL AUGUST 5,2004
Under Idaho law, a cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitation begins
to run, when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another. Galhraith v. Vangas. Inc.. 103
Idaho 912,915,655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct.App.1982). See also Spence v. HOlte/!. 126 Idaho 763,
770, 890 P.2d 7 I 4, 72 I (I995) (The cause of action accrued upon the breach of the contract.);

Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co .. 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of action
does not accrue until aggrieved party suffers damages.); Stephens v. Stearns. 106 Idaho 249, 254,
678 P.2d 41,46 (1984) (A negligence cause of action accrued when the plaintiff sustained
injuries.) Western Corp. v. Vanek 144 Idaho 150,151, 158 P.3d 313,314 Idaho App.,2006.
Assuming Ms. Stephen suffered any damages in this case, she could not have suffered
those damages prior to August 5, 2004. At that time she was clearly represented by Sallaz &
Gatewod CHTD., a professional corporation, where Dennis Sallaz was a director. Necessarily,
we must examine Mr. Sallaz's liability from the aspect of a professional corporation.
Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized under this
act shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or
wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person under his direct
supervision and control, while rendering professional services on behalf of the.
corporation to the person for whom such professional services were being
rendered. le § 30-1306
Once again, the Plaintiff failed to provide any information at trial showing that Mr. Sallaz
was acting in a supervisory capacity over Mr. Gatewood. If we look at the entity Ms. Stephen
was dealing with on the date her damages accrued, then Mr. Sallaz, in his personal capacity,
should be dismissed from this litigation.

Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law -3

DURING THE TIME THAT THE RETAINER WAS SIGNED, BUT BEFORE THE
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION WAS FORMED, MR. SALLAZ DID NOT HAVE
ANY LIABILITY TO MS. STEPHEN
Idaho Code § 30- I -204 deals with Liability for pre-incorporation transactions, and it
reads as fo llo ws:
All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, when there was no
incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severalIy liable for all liabilities
created while so acting.
First of all, the Plaintiff did not aver that Defendant Sallaz was liable for any preincorporation transactions in her Complaint.

Instead, this appears to be an alIegation and

strategy that was reserved specifically for trial. Due to the failure of the Plaintiff to properly
plead this allegation it should not be considered by this Court.
Secondly,

I.e. § 30- I -204

holds parties responsible for any liabilities that were created

during the pre-incorporation process. Here, Ms. Stephen did not produce any evidence that she
suffered any damages between the time that she retained the firm, and the time that the firm
became incorporated. So, by reading the plain language of the statute, Mr. SalIaz did not incur
any pre-incorporation liability to Ms. Stephen.
FinalIy, there does not appear to be any Idaho case law dealing specifically with

I.e.

§

30-1-204, but it only speaks to liabilities created during the pre-incorporation process, such as
signing a lease agreement, or some negligent act that occurred during the pre-incorporation
period. Here, assuming Ms. Stephen was somehow harmed by the firms actions, that injury did
not occur during the pre-incorporation process.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS ANY CLAIM AGAINST DENNIS
SALLAZ IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
I.C. § 5-219(4) provides that actions for professional malpractice must be brought within
two years, and that "the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the
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occurrence, act, or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by
reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom .... "
Here, the alleged harm in this case accrued on August 5, 2004. Defendant Sallaz, in his
personal capacity was added as a party in this case on July 2, 2007, nearly three years after Ms.
Stephen's cause of action had accrued. Defendant Sallaz alleged in his answer that this action
was barred by the statute of limitations, so this Defendant would respectfully request this Court
to enter an Order dismissing him trom this action.
DEFENDANT SALLAZ SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS
In considering a request for attorney fees under section 12-120(3), the trial court must
first determine whether any litigant is the "prevailing party," a decision that is committed to the
discretion of the trial court. Gither! v. City orCa/dwell. 112 Idaho 386, 399, 732 P.2d 355,368
(Ct.App.1987); Chadderdon v. King.

104 Idaho 406, 411-12, 659 P.2d 160, 165-66

(Ct.App.1983). The guiding rule for this determination is I.R.c.P. 54(d)( 1)(8), which states:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.

Thus, there are three principal factors a trial court must consider when determining which
party, if any, prevailed: (I) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought;
(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. DaL\y Mfg. Co .. Inc. v. Painthall
Sports. Inc .. 134 Idaho 259, 261-62, 999 P.2d 914, 916-17 (Ct.App.2000); Chadderdon. 104
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Idaho at 41 1,659 P.2d at 165. If the court detennines that a party has prevailed only in part, it
may apportion the costs and attorney fees in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of
the issues and claims involved in the action and the judgment or jUdgments obtained. ld. See
Prouse v. Ransom. 117 Idaho 734,739,791 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Ct.App.1989). Nguyen v. Bui
--- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2789298 Idaho App.,2008.
Here, assuming that Defendant Sallaz is dismissed from the case, then he is a prevailing
party and should be awarded attorney's fees as well as his costs. However, if Mr. Sallaz is not
dismissed he should he should still be awarded a significant majority of his fees and costs. When
considering the three factors above, the Court should note that on July 14, 2008, the Plaintiff
filed an Ofter to Settle for $450,000.

At that time, the Plaintiff was seeking damages related to

her spousal support, in addition to damages for the Defendant's handling of her Qualified
Domestic Relations Order.
Literally, the day before trial, the Defendants and this Court were notified that the
Plaintiff would not be proceeding on her claim for spousal support or for the Q.D.R.O. Instead,
the parties went to trial over the following amount:

Plaintiff's claim regarding Crescent Rim:
Plaintiffs appraised value of the home:
Stipulated value of the home:
Difference:
Minus half for community property:
Claim:
Plaintiff's claim for judgment paid by Gary
Stephen:
Judgment paid prior to divorce:
Minus half for community property
Claim:

I Total amount requested:

Dcfcndant Sallaz·s Findings of Fact .lI1d Conclusions of Law-6

$458,000
$385,000
$73,000
$36,500
$36,500

$28,000
$14,000
$14,000

$50,500

I

As you can see, if Ms. Stephen were awarded the entire amount she is seeking then she
would be entitled to $50,500.

This means that prior to trial the Defendants prevailed in

defending $399,500 worth of the Plaintiff's claim. [n other words, if the Plaintiff were awarded
her entire request, she would only prevail on 1/9 th of her total claim, whereas the Defendant
would be successful on 8/9 th of their defense.
However, based upon the evidence provided at trial, the Plaintiff's award, if any, should
be reduced significantly based on the following factors:
1. Value ofthe Beach Street home, which would have been Gary's property.
a. $105,000 - $85,000 = $20,000
2. Excess value of equalization payment:
a. $80,965 - $13,095 = $67,870
b. $67,87012 = $33,935 (The amount Pam should have been awarded)
c. $48,000 (The amount Pam was awarded in equalization)
d. $48,000 - $33,935 = $14,065
3. These two figures alone equal a downward adjustment
$34,065.

In

the Plaintiff's request of

4. Therefore, $50,500 - $34,065 = $16,435
The above adjustments can be mathematically calculated, but there are additional
departures that should be counted against the Plaintiff's request for damages, they are:
I. Community Waste:
a. The Plaintiff admitted to using methamphetamines for a number of years leading
up to the divorce, and tested positive for meth use approximately ten days prior to
the date ofthe divorce.

b. The Plaintiff was living in the Crescent Rim home for at least one year prior to the
entry of the divorce, and kept the home in terrible condition at least according to
Ann Shepard.
c. The Plaintiff admitted that she was receiving rent from the Beach Street House,
while her husband was paying the mortgage on that property.

2. Failure to Mitigate Damages:
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a. The Plaintiff filed this Complaint approximately three days before the Statute of
Limitations would run against Defendant Gatewood.
b. The PlaintifT received the benefit of her negotiated and stipulated divorce for two
years.
c. The Plaintiff received every equalization payment from Mr. Stephen before filing
this Complaint.
d. The Plaintiff never filed a Motion to Set Aside her Decree, which would have
given the magistrate who heard this case an opportunity to determine whether Ms.
Stephen's claims of mental incompetency had any merit.
e. The Plaintiff never filed a Motion to ModifY her Decree, which, once again,
would have given Judge Dayan opportunity to hear the merits of her case.

3. The Plaintiff's appraisal should be adjusted for the following:
a. The appraiser specifically stated that he would need to re-visit his appraisal if he
did not obtain the information regarding the condition of the home in August,
2004 from the person living in the home at that time.
b. The appraiser testified that he obtained his information about the condition of the
home from Mr. Stephen, but Ms. Stephen was living in the home in August 2004.
c. The appraiser stated that if methamphetamines were being used in the home that
lower the appraised value ofthe home. However, he stated he did not know of any
illegal drug use in the home in August, 2004.
d. The appraiser failed to take into account similar properties that were within a one
mile radius ofthe Crescent Rim home, which he even admitted was a violation of
Fannie Mae - Freddie Mac financing guidelines.
e. The appraiser went specifically to the most expensive area
Springs) to locate similar properties for the Crescent Rim home.

4. The Plaintiff failed to prove that the $28,000 paid
community funds:

by

In

Boise (Warm

Gary was paid with

a. The Satisfaction of Judgment offered into evidence by the Plaintiff
$30,2 I 4.79.

IS

for

b. The debt that was paid by Gary Stephen prior to the divorce was $28,000.
c. There is no evidence in the record that this satisfaction of judgment is the bilI paid
by Gary in the divorce decree.
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d. The Plaintiff failed to prove that this debt was paid with community funds.
e.

It is highly likely that this debt was paid off with another debt because Gary's
attorney Ann Shepard stated that during the divorce he was "strapped for cash."

(

If Gary paid this debt with another loan, then that new loan would be community
property, and Pam may be liable for an additional $14,000.

g. It is just as likely that Gary paid this debt with a new loan because there was a
pending writ of execution.
Based upon the foregoing factors, the Plaintiff's claim should be reduced significantly or
even eliminate the Plaintiff's claim entirely. Consequently, this Defendant believes an award of
attorney's fees and costs is warranted.

Chari s C. Crafts
Attorney for Defendant Denn'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of September, 2008, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT SALLAZ'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

5

Case No. CVOC06-14241

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,
6
7

8

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

9
10
11

12
13

14
15

16

17

SALLAZ &GATEWOOD, CHTD. and
SCOTT GATEWOOD,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Eric Clark of The Real Estate Group
Robert Wallace, Guardian ad Litem for the Plaintiff, Pamela K. Stephen
For Defendant Scott Gatewood: John Prior of the Law Offices of John Prior
For Defendant Dennis Sallaz: Charles Crafts of Crafts Law, Inc.
th
th
th
This matter came on for court trial on August 11 , 12 , 14th and 18 , 2008. On
August 18th , the Court took the matter under advisement and gave counsel the

18

opportunity to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be filed with
19

the Court on or before September 8, 2008.
20

PROCEEDINGS
21

A Complaint was filed in this case asserting attorney malpractice on the part of
22

Scott Gatewood, Dennis Sallaz, and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered. The parties waived
23

their respective right to a jury trial and the matter was presented to the Court.
24

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants were negligent in their representation of
25

her by failing to obtain an equal division of community assets in the divorce.
26
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The

1

Plaintiff asserts that she was suffering from a mental health condition that impaired her

2

understanding of the proceedings and that she did not receive information about the

3

divorce proceedings that would have allowed her to make knowing and intelligent

4

decisions about the settlement that was reached. Further, the Plaintiff asserts that the

5

Defendants failed to properly investigate the fair market value of the Crescent Rim

6

property and the correct amount of indebtedness owing against that property and thus,

7

she received a less than equitable share of the community real property as a result of

8

the failure of the Defendants to investigate those issues.
ISSUES

9

10

The issues that this Court must resolve in this case are as follows:

11

1. Was the Plaintiff impaired due to her bi-polar condition and the medications

12

she was taking during the course of the attorney-client relationship and at the

13

time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and did the Defendant Gatewood

14

breach his duties as to an impaired client during his representation of the

15

Plaintiff? Did the Defendant Gatewood adequately communicate information

16

about the property issues in the divorce proceedings with the Plaintiff?

17

2. Did the Defendant Gatewood breach the duty to investigate the value and

18

debts of the community real property during his representation of the

19

Plaintiff?

20
21

3. Was this breach of duty the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff?
LEGAL STANDARD

22

The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (a) the existence of an attorney-

23

client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to

24

perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate

25

cause of the damage to the client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 (Idaho 2004).
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2

The Plaintiff was served with a Complaint for Divorce in May of 2003 by her

3

husband, Gary Stephen (hereinafter referred to as Stephen) and retained Sallaz and

4

Gatewood Chartered to represent her in June of 2003. Scott Gatewood (hereinafter

5

referred to as Gatewood) was the lawyer who represented the Plaintiff on all legal

6

matters pertaining to this divorce case. The attorney representing Stephen was Ann

7

Shepard.

8

In this case there is no dispute that there was an attorney-client relationship

9

between Gatewood and the Plaintiff from the signing of the retainer agreement in June

10

of 2003 until after the judgment and divorce decree was entered in August of 2004 and

11

continuing into 2005.

12

There was no evidence presented to the Court that Dennis Sallaz provided any

13

legal services directly or indirectly to the Plaintiff nor did he act in a supervisory capacity

14

over Gatewood. Sallaz and Gatewood formed a professional service corporation in

15

September of 2003, known as SALLAZ &GATEWOOD, CHTD, and continue to the

16

present date in that business organization.

17

At the time of Gatewood's initial meeting with the Plaintiff, there were

18

discussions regarding the community property, spousal maintenance and other related

19

issues. In this case, the Plaintiff had been married to Mr. Stephen since 1976. Mr.

20

Stephen was a pilot for UPS and had income in excess of approximately $171,000 per

21

year and the Plaintiff and Stephen had accumulated assets during the course of the

22

marriage that were not substantial but were certainly above the average community

23

property assets. (See Exhibit 105 and 106). The Plaintiff advised Gatewood that she

24

thought the value of the community residence located on 3309 Crescent Aim in Boise

25

was $400,000.
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The Plaintiff advised Gatewood that she suffered from a bi-polar mental heath
2

disorder and Gatewood made such a notation in their initial May 3, 2003 appointment.

3

(See Exhibit 113)

4

spousal maintenance because she had not been employed during the marriage. (See

5

Exhibit 108).1

The Plaintiff's primary concern as testified to by Gatewood was

6

In August of 2003, Gatewood sought to obtain temporary spousal maintenance

7

for the Plaintiff. During this process he became concerned about pursuing temporary

8

spousal maintenance based upon several factors.

9

First, the Plaintiff was living in the community residence on Crescent Rim and

10

Stephen was paying the loan, utilities and other related costs and all of these could

11

have been an offset to any spousal maintenance. A further complicating issue was that

12

the Plaintiff was openly living with another man and allegedly supporting him. Finally,

13

the Plaintiff was receiving rental income from other rental property, the "beach house,"

14

and not paying the loan payments and other expenses on that property. Gatewood was

15

also advised by Stephan's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the Plaintiff was using

16

methamphetamine. Based upon these issues and concerns, Gatewood did not pursue

17

temporary spousal maintenance. Thus, Gatewood as early as September, was aware

18

of the Plaintiff's unstable living conditions.

19

In the next phase of the proceedings both of the attorneys for the Plaintiff and

20

Stephan exchanged discovery requests in the form of interrogatories and requests for

21

production of documents. Stephan, in response to the initial discovery request in

22

September of 2003 submitted by Gatewood on behalf of the Plaintiff, indicated in

23

Interrogatory No.1, that the Crescent Rim property had a fair market value of $500,000.

24
25
26

1 Exhibits 120-123 are notes of Gatewood that establish that he was aware of the Plaintiff's continuing and
worsening mental health issues during the fourteen month period of his representation of her, including
the Plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization five days prior to the divorce hearing on August 5, 2004.
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The relationship between Gatewood and the Plaintiff was poor from the
2

standpoint of communication. The Plaintiff testified that she received very little

3

correspondence such as letters, court pleadings and discovery documents during the

4

course of her representation by Gatewood. The Plaintiff contends she did not receive

5

information from GateWOOd that Stephen had placed a value on the Crescent Rim

6

property of $500,000. Gatewood testified that he had no specific recollection that he

7

discussed this information with the Plaintiff but contends that general office policies

8

would have resulted in the Plaintiff receiving this information.

9

Gatewood testified that the office policy was to provide all of this type of

10

information to clients but he had no specific recollection as to what documents had

11

been provided to the Plaintiff and no cover letters or other evidence of what

12

documentation the Plaintiff had received during the two years that he represented the

13

Plaintiff was introduced into evidence. Gatewood testified that there were inconsistent

14

policies between the paralegals in his office as to providing information to clients.

15

Gatewood testified that there were periods of time when he did not have contact

16

with the Plaintiff despite repeated phone calls to the Plaintiff to contact him. Gatewood

17

testified that he went over to the Plaintiff's home on numerous occasions to try and

18

communicate with her as to ongoing issues in the divorce over the course his

19

representation of her. This is demonstrated in Gatewood's billing statement that

20

showed little or no activity from January 28 through April 30 of 2004. In January of

21

2004 during a phone call with the Plaintiff, Gatewood testified that the Plaintiff sounded

22

groggy, was not responsive, that she advised him that she had been in bed for 5 days

23

and a doctor wanted to hospitalize her.

24

In July of 2004 the relationship had reached the point that Gatewood filed a

25

motion to withdraw stating a complete breakdown in communications; however,

26
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1

Gatewood withdrew the request. Gatewood testified that he was aware of the

2

involuntary hospitalization of the Plaintiff days before proceeding to a final hearing on

3

the divorce. In addition, Gatewood testified that he was of the opinion that the Plaintiff

4

was using methamphetamine during the time he represented her.

5

The Court will find that there were times when the Plaintiff was not provided with

6

documentation pertaining to the case because there was not in place any type of an

7

effective document policy in the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. that would

8

demonstrate or verify that the Plaintiff was receiving correspondence in the form of

9

discovery responses and other pleadings in a case. No evidence in the form of

10

correspondence or testimony from the Defendants' paralegal staff was presented to the

11

Court as to what, if any, correspondence was provided to the Plaintiff, with the

12

exception of the affidavit in support of temporary spousal maintenance and the answers

13

to interrogatories and production of documents. The Court will find that the Plaintiff's

14

testimony that she did not receive these documents is the most credible testimony.

15

Plaintiff and Stephen did meet a few weeks prior to the divorce trial with a

16

mediator, Steve Beer, without counsel present, in an attempt to resolve some of the

17

issues in this case. No evidence was presented as to what observations, if any, Steve

18

Beer had as far as the Plaintiff's understanding of the issues during the mediation was

19

presented to the Court.

20

Approximately five days before the August 5, 2004 divorce trial date, the Plaintiff

21

was involuntarily committed to a local mental health hospital.

The Plaintiff advised

22

Gatewood of this on July 2ih. Gatewood did not inquire of the Plaintiff where she had

23

been hospitalized, for what reason or by what doctor.

24

The Plaintiff testified generally that during the course of the divorce proceedings,

25

she had very little memory of what was taking place because of her mental state and

26
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the medications that she was taking. Sam Hoagland, who is both a licensed attorney
2

and pharmacist, testified that the "cocktail" of medications that the Plaintiff was taking

3

could have resulted in medication induced confusion on the part of the Plaintiff.

4

The Plaintiff testified specifically that due to this lack of communication with her

5

lawyer, her state of mind and her involuntary mental health hospitalization five days

6

prior to the court date in which the property settlement agreement was presented to

7

Judge Day, that she had little or no understanding of what was being presented to the

8

divorce court on these issues.

9

The parties on the day of the scheduled trial met, conversed and ultimately

10

appeared before Judge David Day with a proposed decree of divorce and property

11

settlement, listing assets and debts of the parties attached to that judgment and decree

12

of divorce as set out in Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1 03.

13

During the course of the proceedings, Judge Day asked each of the parties, Mr.

14

Stephen, the plaintiff in that divorce proceeding and the Plaintiff, the defendant in that

15

divorce proceeding, under oath, if they understood the settlement agreement and were

16

they in agreement with the settlement. Mr. Stephen indicated he was. The Plaintiff

17

indicated she was also in agreement "as far as I know." The decree was submitted to

18

Judge Day and is Exhibit 103.

19

Gatewood testified that when he dealt with the Plaintiff on the day of the divorce

20

court appearance in which the property settlement agreement was reached that he

21

found the Plaintiff to be clear in her thoughts and understanding of the proceedings and

22

that he did not believe that she was impaired as a result of methamphetamine use

23

and/or mental health issues. He testified that she appeared to be angry at the time.

24

Although the Court cannot use the Code of Professional Conduct for attorneys

25

as a basis for civil liability, clearly the Rules of Professional Conduct can be utilized to

26
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at least define duty.
2

Since the enactment of those rules on July 1, 2004, there have been added

3

provisions that pertain to impaired clients. Specifically, Rule 1.14 deals with clients with

4

diminished capacity.

5

client has diminished capacity and is at risk of substantial financial or other harm unless

6

action is taken and that client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, a

7

lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action including consulting with

8

individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and in

9

appropriate cases, seek an appointment of guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

10

One of the comments in 1.14 discusses a reconsideration period to permit clarification

11

of improvement of circumstances and that a lawyer may seek guidance from an

12

appropriate diagnostician in determining the extent of client's diminished capacity.

Subpart (b) sets out a lawyer who reasonably believes that a

13

In this case, Gatewood readily conceded that he believed the Plaintiff was

14

consuming methamphetamine and he knew that she had been hospitalized involuntarily

15

just days before the divorce hearing.

16

Cathy Naugle testified as the Plaintiff's expert as to the duty owed by an attorney

17

to a client during the applicable time frame of these proceedings. Ms. Naugle, a well

18

respected and experienced family law attorney and former magistrate judge who now

19

primarily handles domestic relations cases, testified that in her opinion as an expert on

20

this issue that there was a breach of that duty on the part of Gatewood by not seeking

21

additional information about her mental state or seeking a guardian ad litem

22

appointment for the Plaintiff when he became aware of the fact that the Plaintiff had

23

been involuntarily hospitalized just days prior to negotiating the property settlement

24

agreement.

25

requires a finding by a court that the patient is mentally ill, likely to injure herself or

Considering that the standard for an involuntary mental hospitalization

26
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others or is gravely disabled due to mental illness; and lacks capacity to make informed
2

decisions about treatment, the Court must concur with Ms. Naugle's opinion.

3

Granted, the Plaintiff had been released from the involuntary commitment which

4

can be an indication that the patient has been stabilized psychiatrically, that does not

5

equate to a client being capable of understanding a legal proceeding that deals with the

6

equitable division of property and the complexities of that process. Sam Hoagland's

7

testimony though insightful as to how psychotropic medications can create problems for

8

a patient, the Court cannot find that the Plaintiff was confused as a result of medication

9

issues alone. Though this Court cannot make a finding from the evidence presented in

10

this case that the Plaintiff was impaired to the pOint that she was incompetent, the Court

11

can find from the evidence the Plaintiff was not in a state of mind to comprehend all of

12

the issues she was facing in this litigation in a knowing and intelligent manner.

13

When a client has been involuntarily hospitalized and the client's attorney has

14

had to go to the client's home to communicate with that client on ten occasions, there is

15

obviously a problem that should have been addressed by Gatewood either through

16

contact with the Plaintiff's medical providers to determine her level of impairment or

17

appointment of a guardian ad litem. In the alternative, Gatewood should have advised

18

Judge Day of the recent hospitalization so that a continuance could have been granted

19

to give the Plaintiff additional time to process these issues or for the appOintment of a

20

guardian ad litem. This is clearly allowed under the Rules of Professional Conduct and

21

not a violation of client confidences. Gatewood had more than ample information and

22

personal observations that should have alerted as to his duty to inquire further about

23

the Plaintiff's mental health status.

24

Other than Gatewood's testimony, no other lawyer expert testified for the

25

Defense on this issue of duty or for that matter any other aspect of the issue of

26
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negligence.
2

Even assuming the Plaintiff was not impaired, the issue of the investigation by

3

Gatewood as to the valuation of the Crescent Rim property demonstrates an additional

4

breach of duty on the part of Gatewood.

5

Stephan initially placed a value of $500,000 on the property and the Plaintiff

6

initially placed a value of $400,000 on the property. This is a significant disparity as

7

testified to by Ms. Naugle.

8

The evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was not advised by Gatewood that

9

Stephan had placed a value of $500,000 on the Crescent Rim property. The Plaintiff

10

was not aware of this even at the time of negotiations for the division of community real

11

property.

12

value may have been the correct value for the property.

This is vital information to a party to divorce litigation because the higher

13

Ms. Naugle testified as an expert on behalf of the Plaintiff that Gatewood failed

14

to meet the applicable standard of care for an attorney practicing in 2003 and 2004 by

15

not seeking a comparative market analysis of the Crescent Rim property. Even if the

16

Plaintiff was short of funds, Ms. Naugle testified that a real estate agent, at little or no

17

expense, could have shed more objective light on this real property valuation issue. As

18

Ms. Naugle testified, this variance is too significant to rely on the client's information

19

alone.

20

What is of concern to the Court is that Stephen, who initially gave an opinion that

21

the property was worth $500,000, was awarded the residence. Gatewood testified that

22

he had heard from Stephen's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the Plaintiff was very

23

knowledgeable about the fair market value of the residence. However, in light of the

24

fact that the Plaintiff was possibly impaired from methamphetamine use and was, by

25

Gatewoods's own notations in her file, showing signs of deterioration as to her mental

26
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health, he breached the duty he owed to his client when he failed to investigate this
2

critical valuation issue in this case. The $385,000 that the Plaintiff had subsequently

3

indicated the property value on the Crescent Rim property to be worth was the valuation

4

used in the calculation of the division of the community real property.

5

In divorce cases deliberate undervaluation by a party is not at aJl uncommon

6

especially when that party is requesting to be awarded that asset in the divorce action.

7

In the event the property is awarded to that party in the divorce they may sell or dispose

8

of that asset for the asset's actual higher value and gain a windfall.

9

Gatewood testified that it is not at all uncommon in divorce proceedings for the

10

parties to negotiate a property settlement based upon property values that they receive

11

from their clients.

12

provided to him by the Plaintiff. Cathy Naugle testified that this conduct by Gatewood

13

of solely relying upon property valuations from clients, especiaJly where there is such a

14

disparity in valuation, fell below the standard or duty for an attorney in this type of

15

proceeding. The Court will find Cathy Naugle's testimony was credible and accurate in

16

this regard and therefore the Court wiJl find that Gatewood breached the applicable

17

standard of care as a lawyer practicing in 2003 and 2004 by not investigating the value

18

of the real property when there was such a disparity in valuation by the parties.

In this case Gatewood did have a 1999 appraisal of the property

19

The Court then wiJl find that because of Gatewood's failure to properly

20

investigate the fair market value of the property along with the correct amount of

21

indebtedness owing against the property, coupled with the Plaintiff's questionable

22

mental health status, that the Plaintiff, as a proximate result of Gatewood's breach of

23

duty on all of these issues, did not receive an equitable award of community real

24

property.

25

The damages issue in this case is clouded in part due to the fact that only

26
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portions of the property distribution in the divorce were addressed in the Plaintiff's
2

damage claims.

3

Gatewood contends that the settlement agreement was the best that the Plaintiff

4

could expect and that based upon the appraisal testimony by his experts the Plaintiff

5

suffered no damages.

6

Gatewood's first position is that the "beach house" was separate property of

7

Stephen and because this was included as community property, the Plaintiff received a

8

$42,500 community share that she should not have received. The problem with this

9

position is that Stephan from the outset of this litigation listed the beach house as a

10

community asset. For this Court to award this as an offset against damages would go

11

against the clear evidence that this real property was in fact a community asset.

12

Gatewood also testified that there were concerns about not only the boyfriend, and not

13

only an inappropriate lifestyle, but there had been an ongoing waste of community

14

assets. Gatewood went on to testify that these were the balancing issues that took

15

place in this divorce settlement process and that the Plaintiff received a favorable

16

settlement in this case.

17

demonstrated that the Plaintiff wasted community assets and that this should be an

18

offset as to the real property division.

Again, there was no credible evidence presented that

19

As to the issue of damages, the Plaintiff called William Schultz to testify that

20

based upon his appraisal of the premises, the premises was worth $458,000 at the time

21

of the property settlement agreement in August of 2004 rather than the $385,000 set

22

forth in the property settlement.

23

Gatewood called two appraisers who opined that the property had a value

24

between $275,000 and $400,000. The Court will find that the fair market value of the

25

residence at the time of the divorce in August of 2004 was $440,000. The Court bases

26
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this on fact that the Defense witnesses correctly pointed out that some of the
2

comparable properties utilized by William Schultz in his appraisal were not of like value

3

and location thus resulting in a higher valuation than established by accepted appraisal

4

standards.

5

There was testimony presented that in the course of the divorce there were

6

negotiations between the parties and that based upon the total assets and the total

7

debts, that Stephen received a net $67,870 amount over and above what the Plaintiff

8

received as a result of the settlement agreement.

9

month to the Plaintiff for a course of 24 months or $48,000 as an equalization payment

10

However, Stephen paid $2000 a

to the Plaintiff, which she has received.

11

There was a claim in this case that there was a $28,000 judgment lien against

12

the Crescent Rim property that should not have been listed as a debt in the

13

presentation to Judge Day. Exhibit 117, the $28,000 indebtedness against the Crescent

14

Rim property as set out in the decree of divorce had in fact been paid nearly two

15

months prior to the divorce tria/. The Plaintiff indicated that she did not know the status

16

of this debt when she answered the request for discovery in Exhibit 108. Other than the

17

list of debts set forth in Exhibit A attached to the divorce decree and Stephan's answer

18

to Interrogatory No.3, no other investigation was done by Gatewood to determine the

19

status of this debt. Gatewood should have obtained documentation as to this debt prior

20

to the

s~ttlement

agreement.

21

In this case, the Court has found that there was an under-evaluation of the

22

Crescent Rim property in the amount of $55,000 and in addition a $28,000 debt that

23

should not have been included in the debt division in the decree. Thus the total amount

24

of the damages brought about by Gatewood's breach of duty was $83,000.

25

Plaintiff, being entitled to half of that, the gross damages total $41,500.00
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The

1

However, the Plaintiff received an offset that exceeded the original calculations

2

as set forth in the decree of divorce. The Plaintiff received payments of $2,000 a month

3

for two years and this was in light of the difference between the net community assets

4

received by Mr. Stephen in the divorce proceeding versus those received by the Plaintiff

5

in the divorce proceeding. The actual equalization was $33,935 (1/2 of $67,870), when

6

in fact the Plaintiff received $48,000 thus there was $14,065 paid in excess of the

7

equalization.

8

damages. Thus the Plaintiff has established in this case that she was damaged in the

9

amount of $27,435.00.

The Court will find that this is an offset against the $41,500.00 in

10

JUDGMENT

11

THEREFORE, the Court will find that Plaintiff has prevailed in these proceedings

12

and is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $27,435.00. Counsel for the Plaintiff will

13

prepare a judgment reflecting the Court's findings. The judgment will reflect Scott

14

Gatewood and Sallaz and Gatewood Chartered as the Defendants that are responsible

15

for this judgment.

16

defendant for purposes of the damage award.

17

DATED this

Dennis Sallaz in his individual capacity will not be listed as a

3

day of October, 2008.

18

ICHAEL McLAUG
DISTRICT JUDGE

19

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

./?n:1

2

I hereby certify that on the:5

day of October 2008, I mailed (served) a true

3

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
4

5

6
7

8
9

10
11
12

Eric R. Clark
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP
PO Box 2504
Eagle, 1083616
John Prior
ATTORNEY AT LAW
16 12th Ave S, Ste 113
Nampa, 1083651-3962
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

13

)
I

./

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN
Case No.: CV OC 0614241

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

v.

SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT
GATEWOOD,
Defendants.

The Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on October 3,
2008, and therein directed the entry of Judgment for the Plaintiff. In accordance with the Court's
decision on October 3,2008, Judgment according to Rule 58(a), IRCP, is hereby entered for the
Plaintiff Stephen and against Defendants Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD,jointIy and
severally; and these Defendants alone, and not Defendant Dennis Sallaz individually, are
responsible for the Plaintiff's damages of $27,435.00.
DATED this

d

S

day of November, 2008.

~

ichael R. McLaughlin
District Judge

JUDGMENT -1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF

SERVIC~

I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day ofWevsmeer;2008, I caused to be
served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

JOHN PRIOR
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113
Nampa, Idaho 83651

US Mail

CHARLES C. CRAFT
CRAFTS LAW, INC.
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120
Boise, ID 83705

US Mail

ERIC CLARK
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83616

US Mail

Clerk of the DiStfiCtCOllft"

JUDGMENT - 2

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

v.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD

)

Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009
'Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241

)
)
)

Defendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents.

)
)

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant on December 22, 2009.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent/Cross-Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the
document listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
l. Answer and Counterclaim (Plaintiffs Exhibit 102), file-stamped June 20, 2003.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, file-stamped January 17,
2007;
2. Affidavit of Eric R. Clark, file-stamped January 17,2007;
3. Affidavit of Robert A. Wallace, file-stamped January 17,2007; and
4. Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, filestamped March 16, 2007.
DATED this L d a y of December 2009.

/'-'StePhen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc: Counsel of Record

copy

NO.

'iI

A.&t_ _

DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB No. 1053
G. SCOIT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982
SALlAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID.
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 8956
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telepbone: (208) 336-1145
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263

JUN 20 28D:3

-

J. DAVID NAVARAQ f"iA~
8y BJ KNAPP 1~"
CE?lrr-(

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFADA

GARY ALLEN STEPHEN,

)
)

PJaintifflCounterdefendant,

Case No. CV DR 0301151 D

)
)
)

vs.

)

ANSWER
AND
COUNTERCLAIM

)

PAMELA KATHERINE STEPHEN,

)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

ANSWER

COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through her attorney, Sallaz & Gatewood,
Chtd., and in answer to Plaintiffs Complaint filed herein, admits, denies and avers as
follows:
1.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not specifically

admitted herein.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations as stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of

Plaintiff's Complaint.
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. I

-

3.

Defendant denies the allegation in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and

affIrmatively alleges that Plaintiffhas been forced to retain the firm ofSallaz & Gatewood,
Chtd. to protect her interests herein and that Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred.
COUNTERCLAIM
As and for a counterclaim against Plaintiff, Defendant alleges as follows:
1.

The parties were married to one another on the 17tb day of December, 1976, at Boise,

Ada County, Idaho, and have been, and now are husband and wife. The parties resided
together as husband and wife in Idaho.

2.

There has been cine (1) child born as issue of the marriage who is now an adult.

3.

That dming the marriage of the parties, they have accumulated community propert'j

which should be equitably divided between the parties.

4.

That during the marriage of the parties, they have incurred certain community debts

which should be equitably divided between the parties.

5.

That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her

reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional limitations is unable to support herself
through employment.

6.

That there is a substantial disparity of the incomes of the parties and that Plaintiff!

Counterdefendant should be ordered to pay to DefendantiCounterclairnant, monthly
maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of the DefendantiCountercIaimant.
7.

That Defendant is without funds to retam an attorney to prosecute this action; that

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2

she has employed Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. and Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to
Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, the sum of $1200.00, plus costs, should this
action be Wlcontested and such sum as the Court may deem reasonable if said action is
contested.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against the Plaintiff as follows:

A. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now existing between the parties
hereto be dissolved and forever set aside and that Defendant be granted an absolute Decree
of Divorce from Plaintiff herein on the groWlds of irreconcilable differences.

B. That the Court order an equitable division of the commWlity property of the
parties hereto.

C. That the parties' community debts should be equitably divided between them.
D. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for maintenance support, the
sum of$2,500 per month in addition to an amount reasonable for Defendant's mortgage. for
a period ofthe Defendant's life from the date hereof.
E. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein,
the sum of$1200.00, plus costs, should this action be Wlcontested and such sum as the Court
,

may deem reasonable if said action is contested; and
F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3

('

DATED This d...O day of June, 2003.
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'"

I hereby certify that on the~ day of June, 2003 ..• I caused to be served a tme
and correct copy of the above and forgoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following.
Ann K. Shepard
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702

ANSWER AND COUNTERClAIM, P. 4

')

_ _ U.S. Mail
_~

Hand Delivered
~ Via Fax: (208) 429-1100

